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ABSTRACT
This survey outlines the evolution of thought leading to the recent
developments in the study of business cycles.The subject is almost
coextensive with short-term inacrodynamics and has a large interface with
economics of growth, money, inflation, and expectations.The coverage is
+-)y.Pry'kg4h v4r 4 ii4 c,1 ,i4 4 tT
Thepaper first summarizes the "stylized facts" that ought to be
explained by the theory.This part discusses the varying dimensions of
business cycles; their timing, amplitude, and diffusion features; some
international aspects; and recent changes.
The next part is a review of the literature on "self-sustaining"
cycles.It notes some of the older theories and proceeds to more recent
models driven by changes in investment, credit, and price-cost-profit
relations.These models are mainly endogenous and deterministic.
Exogenous factors and stochastic elements gain importance in the part on
the modern theories of cyclical response to monetary and real disturbances.
The early monetarist interpretations of the cycle are followed by the newer
equilibrium models with price misperceptions and intertemporal substitution of
labor.Monetary shocks continue to be used but the emphasis shifts from
nominal demand changes and lagged price adjustments to informational lags and
supply reactions.Various problems arise, revealed by intensive testing and
criticisms.This prompts new attempts to explain the persistence of'cyclical
movements and the roles of uncertainty and financial instability, real shocks,
and gradual price adjustments.
One conclusion is that business cycle research will profit most from (a)
the updating of findings from the historical and statistical studies, and (b)
using the results to eliminate inconsistencies with the evidence and to move
toward a realistic synthesis of the surviving elements of the extant theories.
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I.Introduction
Interest in business cycles is itself subject to a wave—like movement,
waxing during and after periods of turbulence and depression, waning in
periods of substantial stability and continuing growth.1At times, confidence
in government institutions and actions persuaded many that cyclical insta-
bility had ceased to be a serious problem.Thus in 1922—29, the early heyday
of the Federal Reserve System, monetary policies were expected to help main-
tain prosperity.In the 1960s, the late heyday of Keynesian economics, fiscal
fine tuning evoked similar hopes.
The present is another time of disillusionment--now extending to both
types of stabilization policy.The sequence of serious worldwide recessions
in the last decade soon refuted the perennially attractive idea that business
cycles had become obsolete.Beyond that, the credibility of both Keynesian
and monetarist explanations has diminished.Once again, the apparent failure
of old solutions prompts the profession to pay more attention to the continued
existence Of business cycles.
The rediscovery of an important subject is always welcome, even if long
1This is well illustrated in the early literature, which focused on the
episodes of commercial crises, but it is also reflected in the timing of
later, classical studies of the nature and causes of business cycles at
large.There is little doubt about the impetus provided in this context by
the major depressions of the late 1830s, 1870s, 1890s, 1907-08, 1920-21, and
most strikingly the 193Os.-2-
overdue.However, much of the recent work has neglected the long history of
both the phenomena of major economic fluctuations and their interpretations,con-
centrating instead on contemporary theoretical and policy controversies, mainlyin
the United States.An overview of selected literature will attempt to demonstrate
that this myopia is costly and needs to be corrected.
The study of business cycles is almost coextensive with short—termmacrody—
namics and it has a large interface with economics of growth,money, inflation,
and expectations. The literature is huge, its level of difficulty is ingeneral
high.This survey attempts to provide a historical background and outlinethe
evolution of thought leading to the recent developments in the theoryand related
evidence.The coverage is extensive, yet of necessity much is left out.This
includes theories that are largely concerned with unemployment andinflation, much
less with business cycles directly.2
In particular, no attempt can be made here to discuss inany detail the sta-
tistical. and historical work on the observed regularities and idiosyncrasiesof
business cycles and their possible long-term changes.This empirical literature
is rich and important:it deserves a separate review.After all, it is the "sty-
lized facts" which it provides that ought to be explained bythe theory.The main
such facts are summarized in the next part (II), but witha minimum of'references
and commentary.
Part III discusses the main elements of older theories, beforeand after the
Great Depression, and proceeds to more recent models drivenby changes in
investment, credit, and price-cost—profit relations.Most of these theories and
models are primarily endogenous and deterministic.Exogenous factors and
2Two sets of writingsshould be mentioned in this context, namely the the-
ories of the new radical economists and those embodied insome of the recent "dis—
equilibrium" models.For summariesor surveys,see Sherman, 1976, Malinvaud,
1977, and Drazen, 1980.
Also, the early mathematical models and the more recent theories ofthe "po-
litical business cycle", receive little attention in thepresent paper; monographs
surveying this literature are Rau,197)4; Gapinski, 1982; and Muilineux,198)4.-3—
stochasticelements are introduced early in Part IV.
The sections that follow deal first with the monetarist interpretation of
business cyc'ies, then with the newer equilibrium models with price
misperceptions and intertemporal substitution.The route leads generally from
"adaptive" to "rational" expectations.The approach is generally monetarist
in the sense of relying on monetary shocks, but the emphasis shifts from
nominal demand changes and lagged price adjustments to informational lagsand
supply reactions.Various problems and complications arise, revealed in large
part by intensive testing and criticism.This leads to new attempts to
explain the persistence of cyclicaLmovemerits, the role of uncertaintyand
financial instability, real shocks, gradual price adjustments, etc.
Conclusions are drawn in the last section (V), which stresses theneed for a
realistic synthesis.
II.Stylized Facts
1.The Overall Aspects and Varying Dimensions of Business Cycles
The term "business cycle" is a misnomer insofaras no unique period—
icities are involved, but its wide acceptance reflects the recognitionof
important regularities of long standing.The observed fluctuations vary
greatly in amplitude and scope as well as duration, yet they also havemuch in
common.First, they are national, indeed often international inscope, show-
ing up in a multitude of processes, not just in total output,employment and
unemployment.Second, they are persistent--lasting as a rule severalyears,
i.e., long enough to permit the development of cumulativemovements in the
downward as well as upward direction.This is well established by the his-
torical chronologies of business cycles in the United States, GreatBritain,
France and Germany, a product of a long series of studies by theNational_14_
Bureau of Economic Research (Burns and Mitchell, 19146; Moore, 1961, 1983;
Moore and Zarnowitz, 19814).For all their differences, business expansions
and contract-ions consist of patterns of recurrent, serially correlated and
cross—correlated movements in many economic (and even other) activities.
Seasonal movements, which are periodic but often variable in size and
pattern, may obscure the cyclical developments to an observer of current
changes in individual time series.The same applies to short erratic
movements which are similarly ubiquitous.But looking back across monthly or
quarterly data representing many different variables, business cyclescan be
clearly distinguished from the other fluctuations in that they areas a rule
larger, longer, and more widely diffused.They dominate changes in the econ-
omy over spans of several years, in contrast to the seasonal and other varia-
tions which spend themselves over spans ofayearor less.They reflect, and
interact with, long growth trends which dominate developments across decades.
Peacetime expansions in the United States averaged about threeyears in
the last half-century, two years in the earlier periods containing ten cycles
each (Table 1).Each of the wartime expansions was much longer.Contractions
averaged close to one year since 1933, about twice as long in the earlier
periods.Thus a definite shift toward longer and more variable expansions and
shorter and more uniform contractions is evident since the "great contraction"
of the early 1930s.Before 1933, recessions were on the average only a few
months shorter than expansions; since then, expansions lastedmore than three
times as long as recessions.The mean duration of full peacetime cycles re-
mained approximately stable at four years.
The individual phase and cycle durations show considerable variability
over time, as shown by the standard deviations in Table 1.However, when the
relatively rare outliers are discounted, fairly clear central tendencies
emerge.Thus the ranges of 1 to 3years, 1to 2 years, and 2 to 5 years-5—
accountfor three fourths or more of the peacetime expansions,contractions,
and full cycles in the United States, respectively.
Table 1
Average Duration of Business Cycles in the United States,18514_1982
Number of
Period Business Average Measures of Phase and Cycles Durations
(Years, Cycles ExpansionContractionFull Cycle (T to T)
(T to T) Covered Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (14) (5) (6) (7)
18514—1897 10 27 9 214 17 51 214
1897—1933 10 23 10 20 10 143 10
1933—1982 10 149 27 11 3 60 26
1933-1982, excl. wars 7 37 15 11 14 148 114
18514-1982 30 33 20 18 12 51 22
l85141982, excl. wars 25 27 11 19 13 146 16
Note:All means and standard deviations (S.D.) are rounded to fullmonths.
Expansions are measured from troughs (T) to peaks (P), contractionsfrom P to T, the
full cycles from T to T.Figures in line 14 exclude the expansions during World War
II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War and the immediatelyfollowing contractions.
Figures in line 6excludealso the expansions during the Civil War and World War I
and the immediately following contractions.For references and the underlying
detail, see Moore and Zarnowitz, 19814.
Theamplitudes of cyclical expansions vary as much as their durations,
with which they tend to be well correlated.The rates of change (velocities) and
diffusion show less variability across the cycles.Table 2 provides some evidence
in support of these generalizations.
In the 20 years between the two world wars three major depressionsoccurred,
including the uniquely deep one of 1929-33.Since then no general declines of corn—
parable magnitude happened, notwithstanding the gravity of recentconditions of
rising and high unemployment in some countries such as the UnitedKingdom.On the
whole recessions became not only much shorter but also shallowerandless dif-
fused.Table 3,usinga sampling of measures for the U.S. businesscontractions of
1920-82, illustrates the contrasting dimensions of major depressions vs. other
declines and the much smaller but consistent differences betweenthe "severe" and
"mild" recessions.—6-
Table2
Selected Characteristics of Seven Expansions,
United States, 1949—1982
Largest Smallest Standard
Line Statistic Value Value Mean Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RealGNP:
1 Duration (months) 106 12 '46 30
2 Total increases (%) 49.2 21.1 14.7
3 Rateof increase (%peryear) 6.4 3.5 1.0
Unemployment rate:
4 Total decline (%points) -5.3 -0.6 —2.7 1.5
Nonfarm employment:
5 Percent of industries expanding 100 73 89 9
Note:The entries in column 1refer to the expansion of 2/1961-12/1969 (lines 1-3)
and 10/191497/1953 (lines 14 and 5).The entries in column 2 refer to the expansion of
7/1980—7/1981.The entries in columns 3and14 cover all seven expansions.Line 5
shows the maximum percentage of nonagricultural industries with rising employment,
based on changesover six month spans.For sources and detail, see Moore and
Zarnowitz, 1984, Table 6.—7—
Table 3
AverageDuration, Depth, and Diffusion of Thirteen Contractions,
United States 1920—1982
Great Two Major Six Severe Four Mild
Line Statistic Depression Depression Recessions Recessions
(1) (2) (3) (14)
1 Average duration (months) 43 16 12 10
Percentage decline:
2 Real GNP -32.6 -13.4 -3.3 —1.7
3 Industrialproduction —53.14 _32.14 -13.1 -7.8
Nonfarm employment -31.6 -10.6 -3.8 -1.7
Unemployment rate:
5 Total increase (%points) 21.7 9.6 3.8 2.3
Non farm employment:
6 Percent of industries contracting100 97 88 77
Note:The contractions of 8/1929—3/1933 is referred to as the Great Depression; the
contractions of 1/1920-7/1921 and 5/1937-6/1938 as the major depressions.The dates of the six
severe recessions are5/19237/19214, 11/19)48—10/1949, 7/1953—5/1954, 8/1957—4/1958, 11/1973—
3/1975, and 7/1981—11/1982.The dates of the four mild recessions are 10/1926—11/1927, 4/1960-
2/1961, 12/1969—11/1970, and 1/1980—7/1980.For sources and detail see Moore and Zarnowitz,
19814, Table 7.-8-
2.Main Features of Cyclical Behavior3
Most industries and sectors of the economy participatein the general
business cycles with substantial regularity, that is,exhibit high conformity
or coherence, but some do not (e.g., agriculture, which dependsheavily on the
weather, and production of naturally scarce resources).Durable producer and
consumer goods tend to have high conformity and large amplitudesof cyclical
movements in production, employment, and inventories.The amplitudes are much
smaller for nondurable goods, and still smaller formost of the (nonstorable)
services.Manufacturers' sales move with greater amplitudesthan wholesalers'
sales, and the latter with greater amplitudesthan retailers' sales.In many
industries, particularly manufacturing ofdurables, production is in large
measure guided by advance orders which show large fluctuationsfollowed with
variable lags by much smaller fluctuations inoutputs and shipments.The re-
sulting changes in backlogs of, unfilled ordersand average delivery lags are
themselves procyclical.
Private investment expenditures, while muchsmaller in the aggregate than
consumer spending, have much larger cycles in percentageterms.Aggregate
production typically fluctuatesmore widely than aggregate sales, which
implies a procyclical behavior of inventoryinvestment.Business profits show
very high conformity and much greater amplitude ofcyclical movements than
wages and salaries, dividends, net interest and rentalincome.
3mis sectionis based primarily on studies of U.S.economic history, but
many of the qualitative features of cyclical behaviorsummarized here are
found as well in the data for other majorindustralized countries with private
enterprise and free markets.See Mitchell, 1913, 1927; Schumpeter, 1939;
Frickey, 19Lt2; Burns and Mitchell,19146; Abramovitz, 1950; Mitchell,1951;
Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 1953; Lundberg,1955; Matthews, 1959, Moore,
1961; R. A. Gordon, 1961; Friedmanand Schwartz, 1963b; Hultgren, 1965; Burns,
1969; Bronfenbrenner, 1969; Zarnowitz,1972, 1973; Moore, 1983; Moore and
Klein, forthcoming.—9—
Thelevel of industrial prices tends to have wider fluctuations thanthe
levels of retail prices and wages.Virtually all U.S. business contractions
before World War II were associated with declines inwholesaleprices.14
However, the last recession to be accompanied by asignificant deflation was
that of 19148—49.Since then the price level never fell cyclically, but each
of the seven U.S. recessions of 1953-82 resulted in a temporaryreduction of
the rate at which prices rose, that is, in somedisinflation.But, in con-
trast to the general price indexes for consumer and producergoods, prices of
industrial commodities and new materials traded in organized auction markets
continued to show high sensitivity to business cycles, often turningdown
early in slowdowns as well as contractions.
Narrowly and broadly defined monetary aggregates usually experience only
reduced growth rates, not absolute declines, in connection with ordinary re-
cessions.Only in cycles with severe contractions do substantial downward
movements interrupt the pronounced upward trends in these series.The income
velocity of money, i.e., ratio of income to the stock of currency and commer-
cial bank deposits held by the public, tends to move procyclically(up in
expansions and down in contractions), allowing for its long trends(downward
before World War II, then upward for some time).
Short—term interest rates display high positive conformity and generally
large amplitudes of'movementsrelative to their average level in each cycle.
However, when measured in basis points, cyclical changes in these series are
typically small when the interest-rate levels are low.Long—term rates
usually lag behind the short-term rates, have much lower conformity andmuch
4This is true for both the periods of long-term inflationary trends
(18143-614,1896-1920) and for those of long-term deflationary trends (18614-96,
1920-32).-10-
smalleramplitudes.The relative movements in both short-term market rates
and bond yiei1s increased very significantly in the recent past as compared
with their historical averages.Near cyclical peaks, short rates tend to come
close to or exceed the long rates; near cyclical troughs, they tend to be much
lower.
Along with these conformity and amplitude characteristics, the recurring
features of business cycles include an array of timing sequences.Months be-
fore total employment, output, and real income turn down, activities marking
the early stages of investment processes begin to decline.These include the
formation of new business enterprises; corporate appropriations for capital
expenditure; contracts for commercial and industrial construction; new orders
for machinery and equipment; new bond and equity issues.Investment
realizations —-constructionput in place, deliveries and installations of
euipment —-keepincreasing long after the decline in these investment commit-
ments as work continues on the backlog of orders accumulated during the busiest
stages of expansion.Indeed, business expenditures for new plant and equipment
often peak when the overall economic contraction is already well underway.At
business cycle troughs, with lower levels of capacity utilization, the delivery
lags are generally shorter, but investment commitments still tend to lead and
expenditures coincide or lag.
Long before the downturn in total sales, profits per unit of sales
decline.Total profits (a product of margins times sales) also lead but by
shorter intervals.Stock prices move early as well, reflecting expected changes
in corporate earnings.Bond prices tend to turn earlier yet (bond yields are
generally lagging).
Labor productivity (output per hour) fluctuates procyclically around a
secularly rising trend, generally with leads.Money wages often rise less than
prices in recoveries and more than prices in late expansion stages.This—11—
combines with the marked and persistent productivity changes to induce a
procyclical and lagging movement in labor costs per unit of output.
Met changes in consumer installment credit and in mortgage credit
outstanding have similar procyclical, leading behavior patterns.So has the net
change in bank loans to business, but here the leads tend to be shorter and less
consistent.Compared with the overall credit flows, the rates of growth in
monetary aggregates show in general lower cyclical conformities and amplitudes
and more random variations.They have historically led at business cycle turns
L.. L4...Ll.. 1........ 1..J.
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long as to produce strong elements of inverted behavior in the monetary growth
rates, that is, extended declines during expansions and rises during short
recessions.
Consumers' "sentiment," i.e., anticipations concerning their economic and
financial fortunes, also has a predominantly leading pattern.Recent recessions
in the United States have been more often than not preceded by downturns, and
recoveries by upturns, in consumer buying plans and actual expenditures on
automobiles, housing and related durable goods.Residential construction
commitments such as new building permits and housing starts have particularly
long leads at peaks and often also at troughs of the business cycle.Here the
gestation periods are fairly short so that the expenditures themselves show
sizable leads.
Change in business inventories not only conforms positively to cycles in
general economic activity but is highly sensitive and volatile, often leading,
albeit by variable and on the average short intervals.Total manufacturing and
trade inventories, on the other hand, are dominated by long trends and tend to
lag.Inventory investment plays a very important role in short and mild cycles,
whereas fluctuations in fixed investment acquire a greater weight in the longer
and larger cycles.-12-
Table 14providesa conspectus of the timing relationships foundto be
typical of business cycles.
3.SomeInternationai Aspects and Recent Developments
Business cycles have tended to be shorterin the United States than in
Europe (e.g., the 1851t-1938 periodwitnessed 21 U.S. cycles averagingfour years
and only 16 British cycles averagine5 1/3 years).However, before World War
II, more than 60 percent of thecyclical turning pointscan be matched for all
four countries covered by the NBERchronologies, and only 10 percentcannot be
matched at all (Moore and Zarnowitz, 198L).After World War II, anera of great
reconstruction in Western Europe andJapan set in, which witnessed firsta res-
toration of sound currencies and freemarkets, then rapid growth.For some time
cyclical setbacks in these countriesassumed the form of retardations ofgrowth
rather than absolute declines.However, these slowdowns and theintervening
speedup phases continued to showa high degree of international diffusion.Then
growth slackened and the "classical"business cycles (with absolutedeclines in
total output and employment)reappeared everywhere in the 1970s.The tendency
for these cycles to be roughlysynchronized across the major tradingcountries
became visible again, even withoutallowances for discrepancies inthe longer
growth trends.4a
In a large economy dominatedby production for domesticmarkets, business
cycles are likely to be inducedprimarily by internal mechanisms (e.g.,fluctua-
tions in spending on durablegoods endogenously and elasticallyfinanced) but
they are then transmitted abroadthrough the movements in importsthat are a
positive function of productionand income.For small and, particularly,less
developed countries, fluctuationsin exports usually call thetune.'Of course,
foreign influences can at timesbe critical for even the largestand relatively
least open economy.This is well illustrated by theadverse effects on the
events rekindled interest in businesscycles of larger dimensions
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































United States of the OPEC oil price boostsin 1973_7L and 1979—80 through
increased co5ts and prices (leftward shiftsin the aggregate supply schedule)
and reduced real disposable income (hencepresumably also some leftward shifts
in the aggregate demand schedule).Such worldwide supply shocks, although
clearly of major importance in the contextof contemporary problems of
productivity, growth and development,are new and rare phenomena whose role in
business cycles generally is modest but indanger of being overemphasized.5
The more persistent effects come fromchanges on the demand side.Thus the
volume, prices, and value of U.S. exportsshow fluctuations that correspond
well to the cycles in the dollar value ofimports by the outside World (Mintz,
1967).The demand changes are powerfullyreinforced when the links between
the major countries convert their independentcyclical tendencies into
fluctuations that are roughly synchronized.
These links result not only from internationaltrade --current-account
transactions in goods and services--butalso from international lending and
investment--capital—accounttransactions in assets.The latter factor
became particularly important in recenttimes when asset markets became highly
integrated worldwide.Interest rates (adjusted for theanticipated exchange
rate movements) are now linkedacross the open economies and capital flowsare
extremely sensitive to the risk—adjusteddifferentials in expected rates of
return.
Partly because of the increased capitalmobility, the shift from fixed to
flexible exchange rates in the early 1970sprovided much less insulation
against foreign disturbances thanwas hoped for, and also much less autonomy
5Cf. Hamilton, 1983,on the role of changes in crude oil prices inthe
U.S. recessions after World War II.It should be noted that manyrecessions
are preceded by upward cost pressures andsupply restrictions associated with
the boom-and-slowdown sequence of mid-and late expansion stages.On the
developments in 1973—76, see Zarnowitzand Moore, 1977.—15—
for effective national macroeconomic policies.The price levels adjusted for
exchange rates (that is, the "real exchange rates") show largeand persistent
movements over time:the purchasing power parity does not hold over time spans
relevant for the study of business cycles.The recent fluctuations in real
economic activity show a very considerable degree of international convergence,
which presumably reflects not only the exposure to common disturbances butalso
the increased interdependence among (openness of)nations.6
In the 1960s, when it appeared that business contractions in Europe and
Japan are being replaced by mere retardations, there was a revival ofinterest
in cycles defined in terms of deviations from long trends rather thanlevels of
economic aggregates.For lack of a better term, the alternations of above-
trend and below-trend growth phases caine to be called "growth cycles."These
short fluctuations are defined by the consensus of detrended indicators just as
business cycles are defined by the consensus of the same time series with no
allowance for their long-term trends.The trends are estimated only to be
eliminated from each series separately.Growth cycles in this sense are thus
sharply different from, and should not be confused with, any fluctuations in
the long—term growth rates themselves.
They also need to be clearly distinguished from business cycles.Most
persistent and pervasive economic slowdowns begin with much reduced but still
positive growth rates, then develop into actual declines --recessions. Thus
the high—growth phase typically coincides with the business cycle recoveryand
mid-expansion, the low-growth phase with late expansion and contraction.But
some slowdowns stay in the range of positive growth ratesand issue in renewed
expansion, not recession.Thus growth cycles are more numerous than business
cycles and more symmetrical, being measured from rising trends.
6See Whitman, 1976; P.A. Klein, 1976; Moore, 1983, ch.6.—16—
One can imagine a lengthy period of low, positive growth that would be
associated with as much deterioration in business conditions and rise in
unemployment as a short and moderate recession -andmore.But it is also
possible for a slowdown mainly to reduce inflationary excess demand created in
the preceeding boom, without causing much surplus capacity and real
hardship.The policy implications of such a deceleration in economic growth
are entirely different from those of a recession which always depresses real
incomes and spending, outputs and employment.
In actual experience, those decelerations in growth that have not led to
absolute declines in aggregate economic activity (in the recent U.S. history,
1951-52, 1962-64, and 1966-67)occupyan intermediate position between the two
hypothetical cases considered above.Their adverse effects were felt
primarily in areas of particular sensitivity, notably as declines in housing
activity and stock prices.Unemployment would cease falling rather than rise
substantially, and profits would weaken rather than tumble.Thus the overall
impact of any of these slowdowns on economic activity was definitely less than
that of even the mildest of the recent recessions.
Some economists focus on the nature and sources of expansions and con-
tractions, that is, on the business cycles.Others, by abstracting from the
long-run trend, actually address growth cycle phenomena while aiming at an
analysis of business cycles; that is, they fail to differentiate between the
two categories.The latter treatment, frequently implicit in the theoretical
literature of recent years, may not be a good practice.General business
contractions need to be distinguished from periods of low but positive
growth.However, mild recessions and severe depressions are also quite
different.Also, many important regularities described in the previous
section are to a large extent observed in the context of growth cycles as—17—
well.Thus when the series that tend to lead at business cycle turns are
adjusted fortheir own long trends, the resulting detrended series are
generally found to be leading at growth cycles turns.An analogous statement
can be made for the roughly coincident andlagging indicators,.Systematic
differences among the series with respect to their conformity and amplitude
characteristics are likewise largely retained after the necessary
transformations.
III.Theories of Self-Sustaining Cycles
1.Disparities and Common Elements in Some Early Theories
The classics of business cycle literature made lasting contributions to
the description and analysis of the motion of industralized market
economies.They addressed the cumulative processes of inflationary expansions
and deflationary contractions induced by bank credit fluctuations constrained
by the availability of reserves under the gold standard (Hawtrey,1913).The
role of discrepancies between the market and the "natural" interest rates in
this process was much explored following Wicksell, (1898) 1936.At below—
equilibrium market rates, excessive bank credit creation produces over-
investment in capital goods industries and imposes "forced savings" on those
whose incomes lag behind inflation (Hayek, 1933).But banks will have to
curtail the supply of credit and individuals will tend to restore their old
consumption standards.As the demand and resources shift back to consumer
goods industries, undersaving or real capital shortage and losses to the
producers of capital goods result, causing a decline in these industries which
cannot be compensated elsewhere in the short run.A deflationary downturn
cannot be avoided.Here the monetary changes are linked to real "vertical
maladjustments", that is, imbalances between production of capital and
consumer goods or between aggregates of investment plans andsavings decisions
(Tugan-Baranovskii (1894) 1913; Spiethoff (1925) 1953).-18-
Other writers worked out theimportance of long gestation andlife
periods of capital goods anddeveloped some cyclical aspectsof the
acceleration principle (Aftalion,1913; J. M. Clark, 1917, 1931).Schumpeter
(1939) saw economic growthitself as a cyclicalprocess reflecting
technological progress andspurts of innovations--openingup and temporary
exhaustion of opportunities fornew profitable investment.Related factors
include the failure of foresight,intersectoraj. shifts, andchanges in
relative prices.Thus, under uncertainty,interdependent expectations of
businessmen generate widespreaderrors of optimism in expansionsand pessimism
in contractions (Pigou, 1927).Unpredictable shifts in demandor supply lead
to "horizontal maladjustments"--say,overinvestment in a particularsector,
which involves indivisible anddurable fixed capital, •highcosts of
adjustments, and temporary butcumulative depressant effects (Robertson,
1915).Unit costs of labor andproduction tend to rise relativeto output
prices before and after thedownturn, and they tend tofall before and after
the upturn, reflecting changesin capacity utilizationand productivity; asa
result, business profits showlarge fluctuations which helpexplain the
cyclical movements in investmentand output (Mitchell, 1913, 1927).
This capsule summarycan merely illustrate the broadrange of views held
by these early students ofbusiness cycles.It is clear that thereare
important disagreementsamong their theories, particularlywith respect to the
relative importance of monetaryand real factors, longa major point of
contention.But the dominant tone isone of awareness that what mattersmost
is the interaction of changesin money and credit andchanges in economic
activity, particularly thoseconnected with business investment.Most of the
writers considered businesscycles to be caused and conditionedby a number of
factors and circumstances,and so their theories typicallyoverlap and vary
mainly in the emphasisaccorded the different elements(1-laberler,19614).—19—
Not surprisingly, there ismuch in these individualtheories that is
unsatisfactOPY, unduly restrictive, orout—of-date.Here we must abstract
from the detail and notethat it is the high degreeof consensus and
achievement that is much moreremarkable from the presentpoint of view.
The first aspect of essentialagreement is that the theories aremainly
endogenous.That is, they purposelyconcentrate on internal dynamicsof the
system (interrelations andlagged reactions among itscomponents).The
authors generally held thatcontemporary industrial economies are,as a result
of such dynamics, subjectto recurrent fluctuationswith major regularities
that can be explainedeconomically.They believed that "thecyclical movement
has a strong tendency topersist, even where there are nooutstanding extra-
neous influences atwork which can plausibly beheld responsible."Hence they
viewed the role of the exogenousforces as secondary, eventhough acknowl-
edging that the lattercontinually act "as the originators ordisturbers of
endogenous processes, with powerto accelerate, retard,interrupt, or reverse
the endogenouS movementof the economicsystem."7
Second, these economists allbasically adhered to thestandard economic
theory of their times,which is what Keynes laterlabeled the "classical
school;" indeed, the latter iswell personified by some ofthem.At the same
time, they generallyappreciated the seriousness of theproblem of economic
instability.The business cycles of theirprincipal concern were major
fluctuations measured in yearsof cumulative expansions andcontractions.The
7Both quotations above are from Haberler, op.cit., p.10.This
characterization is stronglyconfirmed by numerous passagesin works by
Robertson (1915, see inparticular Part II, ch. IV);Mitchell (1927, esp. chs.
I and V); Hayek (1933, esp.ch. IV); and Pigou (1927,chs. VI-Vill, XXI).For
Schumpeter, the basic mechanismof credit-financed innovationsis of much
greater intrinsic interestthan the multitude of diverse"external factors,"
no matter howimportant the latter may be on anyparticular occasion (1935;
1939, vol. I, chs. I—IV).-20-
recurrent phases of widespread unemployment and underutilization of productive
capacities did (and still do) present a deep puzzle to the classical doctrine
according to which the economy is always in, or at least tending closely to,
the general equilibrium.Thus, for a long time, business cycles were simply
ignored by most economic theorists or, at best, were viewed as merely tem-
porary "frictional" interference with, and departure from, equilibrium.But
students of the subject, including those who were themselves committed to the
equilibrium theory, have done much to counteract this evasive and untenable
position.
Third, in the historical periods addressed by these studies the level of
prices tended to move up during the general business expansions and down
during contractions.The positive correlation between cyclical movements in
broad price indexes and real activity measures implied that fluctuations in
total nominal expenditures parallel the fluctuations in the aggregates of real
income, employment, and output.This was generally accepted as a central
characteristic of business cycles by the early theories in which the
fluctuations in aggregate money flows of income and spending play a large,
proximately "causal" role.Of course, for these fluctuations to produce
cyclical movements in real variables, it is necessary that wages and prices
adjust with some sufficient lags rather than being highly flexible.This
condition was sometimes explicitly assumed but not much discussed and often
only implied.8
8Cf.Haberler,19614, pp. 1459-)461.In terms of the present-day conven-
tional macroeconomic model, let us add, the positive correlation of fluctu-
ations in prices and real variables would indicate that shifts in aggregate
demand dominate the shifts in aggregate supply over the business cycle.If
this sounds rather alien to the early theories, it is because the latter are
typically more disaggregate.—21—
2.Uncertain Expectations, Unstable Investment, and Long Depression Cycles
Keynes (1936, ch. 22, esp. pp. 31L315) attributed to the trade cycle a
sudden, sharp downturn, a protracted decline, and a gradual, sluggish
upturn.These are all characteristics of the 1929 peaks and the depressions
and recoveries of the 1930s in Great Britain and the United States; also, in
part, of the British experience in the depressed early 1920s.They are not
typical of most cycles in these countries and elsewhere.
The sharp downturn or "crisis" is explained mainly by "a sudden collapse
in the marginal efficiency of capital."During a boom the supply of new
capital goods and the cost of their production and financing rise, with
growing adverse effects on the current returns on investment.The inducement
to invest is further weakened if the current costs come to be viewed as higher
than the probable future costs.Optimism about the always uncertain future
returns lingers for some time, but sooner or later doubts arise about the
reliability of the hopeful expectations engendered by the boom.
Investment expectations are highly volatile because even those forecasts
of long—term profitability of specific business projects which are viewed as
most probable inspire little confidence.Observable frequencies of past
outcomes are not generally a source of reliable knowledge in these matters.
Keynes' world is thus one of pervasive uncertainty which is sharply distin-
guished from calculable and insurable risk (as in Knight, 1921).
It is easier and more rewarding to predict the short—term movements in
the stock market, which are strongly affected by "mass psychology," than to
divine the long—term prospects for individual business concerns.The market
reacts promptly to news on fluctuating business profits with revaluations
which inevitably exert a decisive influence on the rate of current
investment. new business will not attract investors if a similar existing
one can be acquired on the exchange at lower costs (Keynes, 1936, p.151).-22-
This last insight gave rise to an influential theory of Tobin (1969),
which makes investment in new plant and equipment an increasing function of q,
the ratio of'the value placed by the security markets on the existing firm to
the replacement cost of'itscapital.This approach has several advantages:
it is relatively simple, uses observable variables, and provides an analyti-
cally attractive linkage between investment and the expectations of the
financial asset markets.Implicitly, it also relates the expected profit rate
to the required rate of return on capital in the stock market and hence to the
interest rate.However, the hypothesis has not fared well in empirical tests
(von Furstenberg, 1977; P. K. Clark, 1979; Blanchard and Wyplosz, 1981; Abel
and Blanchard, 1983; Gordon and Veitch, 198Z).This is perhaps partly because
of the use of average q instead of the theoretically more appropriate marginal
q9 butmore likely because of various simplifying restrictions used in this
work:homogeneous capital and perfect financial markets with no liquidity
constraints on firms.These idealizations are poorly suited for an analysis
of cyclical movements in investment and they certainly clash with the
Keynesian views on the instability of financial markets (see section IV-6
below))0
9This is the ratio of'theincrease in the value of the firm from
acquiring an additional unit of capital to the marginal cost of that unit
(which, in contrast to the measured average q, is an ex ante and not directly
observable quantity).
10Thesame observations apply a fortiori to the "neoclassical" investment
theory dating from Jorgenson, 1963, which concentrates on theaverage long—
term behavior as determined by the requirement that the expected returns over
the life of a project exceed its costs.The short-run deterrent effect on
investment of the rising flow supply price of capital goods (stressed in
Keynes, 1936, ch.11) is not well captured in this approach, and the
expectational lags are not distinguishable from the gestationperiods or
delivery lags (cf. Abel, 1980).For recent tests of this and other investment
theories, see also Bischoff, 1971, and Kopcke, 1977.-23-
Once aroused, the doubts about profitability of planned and current
investment projects spread rapidly, bringing down in "disillusion" the stock
market which is revealed to have been overoptimistic and overbrought.As the
pendulum swings to overpessimism, the demand for broadly defined money will
increase, raising the rate of interest and hence seriously aggravating the
crisis.The revival of investment will require a "return of confidence
an aspect of the slump which bankers and businessmen have been right in
emphasizing ..•" (Keynes,1936, p. 317).Butconfidence, once severely
shaken, takes time to mend.Also, the propensity to consume is adversely
affected by the fall in the value of equities.
Only as the downswing develops will it bring the level of interest rates
down.This decline will not be as prompt and large as would be necessary to
counter the "collapse" of investment.For the demand for money is interest.-
elastic, highly so at low levels of the rates, because of bearish speculation
in the face of basic uncertainty as to the future changes in the rate of
interest.The conclusion here is that a recovery from a severe slump is
possible only after the capital stock of business has been reduced
sufficiently to restore its profitability.This may take several years,
through use, wear and tear, and obsolescence (op. cit., p.151).
It might appear that overbuilding is the cause of the downturn and long
slump but Keynes insists that it is not.Rather, the effective private demand
fails to sustain full employment because investment is too unstable and the
propensity to consume is stable but too low.It is only relative to the
deficient demand that "overinvestment" can occur; there is no saturation of
profitable investment opportunities at full employment.
Keynes' concern was with long and severe depressions characterized byvery large declines to low levels of both real investment and stockmarket
values.Such major depressions have occured at intervals ofa few decades
through the t930s but most business contractionswere always much milder and
shorter.Even in long contractions the stock of capital usuallycontinues to
increase, although at much reduced rates; also,an abrupt collapse of
investment is rare.11Consumer spending is much less stable in the shortrun
than Keynes assumed (but also muchmore stable and supportive of growth in the
long run).Asforthe demand for money, there is a mass of evidencethat its
interest elasticity tends to be relatively low (Laidler, 1969).These
observations raise serious questions aboutsome elements of: Keynes' theory.
3.Wageand Price Dynamics in Business Cycles
Despite the great rise and persistence ofunemployment, real wages in-
creased throughout the 1930s thereby failing toprovide one classical cure for
the apparent disequilibrium in the labor market.12Keynes (1936, chs.19 and
21) did not argue that money wagesare entirely rigid downward but rather that
they adjust but sluggishly to excess supplies oflabor.Such slow wage declines
are apt to reduce incomes, consumption, and prices before theybegin to improve
profitability and stimulate investment.When the resulting gradual deflation
becomes widely anticipated, people wouldrepeatedly postpone purchases, mainly
of durable goods, while waiting for pricesto fall further.The demand for
money increases at the expense of the demand for goodsand equities.
These pointswere made early by Burns (see his collected essays, 1954,pp. 3-25, 207-235).On the dispersion of peaks in variouscategories of investment
commitments and expenditures, see Zarnowitz,1973, ch. 4.
121n the UnitedStates, average hourly earnings in manufacturingdivided
either by the consumer price indexor by the wholesale price index rose
approximately 20 percent between 1929 and 1934, forexample.Money wage rates
declined less than prices.Hours of work fell along with the number of the
employed workers.Cf. Temin, 1976, pp. 138-141.-25--
Moreover, unexpected deflation increases the burden of accumulated debt
which falls most heavily on businesses and individuals with high propensities
to borrow, invest, and spend.The activities of these units are severely
curtailed as their bank credit lines are cut.Business failures and personal
bankruptcies rise in numbers and size.Irving Fisher (1932, 1933) ascribed
the depth of the depression to the confluence and mutual reinforcement of
deflation and "overindebtedness" inherited from the boom.(This suggests
overinvestment as the cause of the downturn.)His policy prescription was
monetary reflation, a reversal of the price decline.
A one—time large drop in the general wage level is a theoretical but
hardly a practical alternative in a large decentralized economy with numerous,
strongly differentiated labor markets and a complicated structure of relative
wages.A spreading depression in an open system threatens a competition among
the economies in reducing their export prices, with deeply damaging overall
consequences.
The actual and expected changes in the rates of change in wages and
prices can certainly be of great importance in business—cycle dynamics.The
effects on aggregate demand of changes in the levels of wages and prices, on
the other hand, are believed to have their main roles in comparative statics
and the long run.13The static and dynamic elements were never clearly
13The reference here is, first, to the "Keynes effect" (at lower prices,
a given quantity of money represents a larger real (quantity) and the "Pigou
effect" (at lower prices, a given quantity of net nominal private wealth
represents a larger real quantity).The former would raise investment through
lower interest rates, the latter would raise consumption.To stimulate the
economy in the short run both require downward flexibility of prices
generally.The Keynes effect depends inversely on the interest-elasticity of
the demand for money.The Pigou effect depends positively on the magnitude of
net private wealth, which is probably small in relative terms.Deflationary
expectations and distributional shifts may also weaken greatly this process
(Pigou,19)47; Patinkin, 19)48).—26—
distinguished by Keynes and his immediate critics; the debate proceeded for a
long time in the framework of comparative statics, which obscured the
essentially dynamic disequilibrium nature of Keynes' theory (Leijonhufvud,
1968).
After World War II, inflation became for the first time a chronic
condition in peacetime, drawing attention away from the concurrent, relatively
mild recessions and at the sametimemaking their understanding apparently
much more difficult.The old problem of'depression-cum-deflationwas replaced
by the new problem of unemployment-cum-inflation.The famous "Phillips curve"
emerged first as a nonlinear and inverse dependence of the rate of change in
nominal wages (w) on the rate of unemployment (U) and was rationalized by
relating U to the excess supply of labor (Phillips, 1958; Lipsey, 1960).Soon
the rate of inflation (p) was similarly related to U, on the ground that p and w
normally differ by a steady rate of growth in labor productivity (Sarnuelson and
Solow,196O).1
The classical view of an aggregated labor market posits the existence at
any time of a unique equilibrium or "natural" unemployment rate(UN)as a
function of real wages (Friedman, 1968).An inflation that has lasted for some
significant time will be expected to persist at some positive average rate
(e)Changes in the price level that are generally and correctly anticipated
are matched by wage changes and hence cannot cause deviations of U fromUN).
Only unanticipated inflation, i.e., forecast errors(e
-p),can cause such
deviations.Equilibrium requires thate
=p,hence a stable long-run tradeoff
between p and U cannot exist (the "natural rate hypothesis" --NRH--see
should be noted that from the cyclical perspective it is far from
innocuous so to substitute price for wage inflation.As will be shown in
section 111-6 below, labor productivity and the related price and cost
variables undergo partly systematic changes over the cycle.-27-
Friedman, 1966, 1968; Phelps, 1967).A short-run Phillips curve, associated
with unanticipated or disequilibrium inflation, stays in place only as long as
eremains unchanged.15
The initial reaction of most economists to the Friedman-Phelps critique was
to embrace the NRH without questioning the existence of an inverse relationship
between inflation and unemployment in the short run.This was because they
assumed expectations to be "adaptive," that is, backward-looking and involving
only partial and lagging corrections of pasterrors.16
Indeed, it was frequently assumed that the errors of inflation forecasts are
fully eliminated only on the average over the business cycle.On this
permissive interpretation of a "long run", the NRH is entirely consistent with
continuing parallel fluctuations in inflation and real economic activity around
their (uncorrelated) long trend movements.
The expectations-augmented but only slowly shifting Phillips curve appears
in Tobin's 1975 analysis of Keynesian models of cyclical contractions, with the
qualification that this does not imply a full acceptance of the NRH.In this
dynamic model, output (Q)movesin reaction to changes in aggregate real demand
CE).In the short run the two variables can differ, say, EK QwhenQisrising
because of lags in consumption and unintended inventory changes.E depends
positively on Qandthe expected price changeeand negatively on the price
level P.Actual inflation p (rateof change in P) adjusts to changes ineand
in QrelativetoQN(the full-employment output).Finallyereacts to the
divergencies of p frome•The equilibrium conditions are E =Q, Q =
QN,and p =
e•The main inference from the model is that "a strong negative price-level
15The general form for the original Phillips equation is W=' (Ut);for
the "expectations—augmented" equation satisfying the lIRH it isWt =f(Ut) +p.
16A simple model of this type is p-p1 k -P_1),where 0 Kk <1.
The early locus classicus for adaptive expectations is Cagan, 1956, Also, see
Muth, 1960; Nerlove and Wage,196Lt; and Mincer, 1969.-28-
effect on aggregate demand, a weak price-expectations effect, and a slow response
of price expectations to experience are conducive to stablility" (Tobin, 1975,
pp. 199-200).Large adverse shocks to E can push the economy into a depression,
and market price adjustments will provide no reasonably prompt and effective
remedy under conditions where the price-change effects on E are stronger than the
price—level effects.
17
4•Disequilibrium Models with Capital Accumulation
Keynes' analysis is only implicitly and partially dynamic.Since net
investment varies, so does total capital, which influences output, investment,
and savings.But these effects are ignored and the stocks of production factors
and technology are treated as constant.The older acceleration principle has no
role in the General Theory, and indeed is not even mentioned.But the 1930s and
l9LIOs saw a proliferation of formal models of essentially endogenous cycles in
aggregate output, which use various versions of the investment accelerator and
the consumption multiplier and let the two interact (Harrod, 1936; Kalecki, 1937;
Samuelson, 1939; Metzler, 191; Hicks, 1950).
In most of these formulations, net investment is a function of changes in
output, which implies that fluctuations in consumption are transmitted with
increasing amplitudes to the higher stages of production --thederived demand
for intermediate and producer goods.This contrast in amplitudes is broadly
consistent with the evidence (see section 11—2 above), which has long made the
acceleration principle attractive to business cycle theorists.Yet it is clear
from the data that investment series have much higher persistence or serial
correlations than the series of first differences in output or sales.
17Fora more recent reassessment, with similar conclusions concerning the
cyclical effects of deflation, see Tobin, 1980, ch.I.—29—
The simultaneous relationship between these variables over short unit periods
is weak, not surprisingly, since investment depends on expectational and
financial factors as well as on changes in technology, cost of labor, etc.18
With consumption lagging behind income and induced investment behind
change in output, the multiplier-accelerator interaction can produce a model
of fluctuating output in form of a second-order difference equation.Small
values of'thecoefficient of acceleration result in damped cycles, large
values in explosive cycles.When a trend is added reflecting continuous
technological change embodied in "autonomous" investment, the cycles are
slanted upward around a line whose slope represents the equilibrium rate of'
theeconomy's real growth.In the potentially explosive case, fluctuations in
actual output are constrained between a "ceiling" along which the (growing)
resources are fully utilized and a "floor" set by the nonnegativeness of gross
investment (Hicks, 1950).This model uses distributed lags in consumption and
investment functions and suspends the accelerator during a steep downswing,
with the result that the slump is both cushioned and prolonged as the excess
stocks of capital depreciate but slowly down to the levels required by the low
production at the floor.
A closely related but more general class of models is based on the
capital stock adjustment (or "flexible accelerator") principle:current
investment equals some fraction of the gap between the desired and the actual
capital.The desired stock varies directly with output (taken, questionably,
18The theoryof production function of the firm includes the acceleration
effect but also, in the general case of variable factor proportions and prices,
a substitution effect (see, e.g., Gapinski, 1982, chs. 2 and Li).Net investment
cannot decline in any period by more than the capital stock can be worn out,
which suggests asymmetrical behavior between upswings and downswings. In
principle, it is in the long run, along the rising trend of capacity output,
that the simple accelerator making net investment proportional to the change in
output should work best, not in the short-run of cyclical analysis.-30-
as a proxy for the expected demand for output that the capital is to help
produce).Net investment therefore depends positivelyon output and inversely
on the initially available stock of capital.This formulation (used early in
Kalecki, 1935; Kaldor, 1940; Goodwin, 1951) is capable of beingimproved with
some significant advantages.Since profitability should depend positively on
the output-capital ratio, the role of profits in the investmentfunction
(stressed by many authors, particularly after Tinbergen, 1939)is given at
least an indirect consideration.The fraction of the capital gap closed in
the short unit period (the speed of adjustment)may be made a function of the
interest rate and, more generally, the costs of capital.The costlier the
speed,the more gradual will be the optimal adjustment; thisopens the way to a
potentially useful dynamic analysis.On the other hand, the cyclical changes
in capital stock, being relatively small (and rarely negative),have probably
rather weak short-term effects on investment andoutput.
The dynamics in the models under reviewcomes from lags, nonlinearities,
or both.Monlinearities are likely to be very common in economic
relationships, in part because the numerical values ofcertain important
parameters should vary with the phases of business cycleswhich cover a wide
variety of macroeconomic conditions.Yet few theoretical models of the cycle
make important use of nonhinearities.In Kaldor (1940), investment (I) is a
sigmoid function of output (Q)withmuch lower positive slopes at both
extremes than in the broad middle range of theQscale. Iis deterred by both
surplus capacity in slumps and rising constructionand financial costs in
booms.Saving (S) has a converse shape, with higherpositive slopes at both
extremes than in the middle range of Q:peoplestabilize consumption over
time by temporarily reducing (raising) theaverage rate of savings when their—31—
incomes are unusually low(high).19Given Q,Idepends inversely and S
dependspositively on the capital stock K.There are three possible equilibria,
two of which are stable.The result is a self-sustained cycle in the real
aggregates, from stable to unstable to another stableequilibrium.20
The substantive uses of nonlinearities in the theoryof business cycles
are yet to be systematically explored.There are, to be sure, various non—
linearities in mathematical and econometric models but they are onthe whole
scattered and treated mainly as technical detail.The early models by Kaldor,
Hicks, and Goodwin remain influential in thisliterature.21
Very recently, some methods of the "singularity" and"catastrophe"
theories, new branches of applied mathematics, began to beapplied to the
analysis of large economic fluctuations involving crises,depressions, and
rapid recoveries.The theory is concerned with the interaction of "fast" and
"slow" variables in dynamic systems described by differentialequations, where
the short run equilibrium may jump from one region of the state spaceto
another.For example, the rate of change in output may depend on thelevel of
output, a "fast" variable, and physical capital andfinancial assets, "slow"
variables (expectations or other parameters can also betreated as slow
variables).An illustration using a modified Kaldor model is offeredby
Varian, 1979.This is an interesting approach, though still in its infancy.
19The argument seems to anticipate the more recent theories of
consumption if one adds the assumption that people perceivelarger proportions
of their incomes as being transitory in booms and slumps thanin the more
"normal" times closer to the trend.Transitory income is taken to be largely
saved, permanent income consumed.
20The path of output is dQ/dt cz[I(Q,k) -S(Q,K)1,with a > 0denoting
the speed of adjustment.The equilibria are defined by I(•) S(•);they are
stable whenóS/'SQ >tSI/ÔQ,which occurs at both low and high levels of Q,
andunstable when oS/SQ <OI/OQ, which occurs in an intermediate position.
The responses of Q,i.e.,movements along the I or S curves, are speedier than
the shifts of these curves caused by the changes in K.
list of some references must suffice:(Ichimura, 19514; Rose, 1967;
Bober, 1968; Chang and Smyth, 1971; Kosobud and O'Neil, 1972;Torre, 1977;
Scarfe, 1977, Ch 14;Gapiriski, Chs. 4—6).-32-
While innovative in their dynamics, the modelsdiscussed here are severely
limited in their contents.They slight or ignore the monetary, financial,and
expectational factors which, theory and evidencesuggest, are particularly
important in major cycles, crises, and depressions.Most of these models, too,
neglect the role of new technologyas a determinant of investment (Goodwin,
1951, is a notable exception).These criticisms have been made early inthe
heyday of the endogenous investment theories ofthe cycle (Burns, 1952;
Haberler, 1956; Lundberg, 1958).Hansen (1951) 19614 viewed the acceleratoras
relatively weak and stressed the driving forceof autonomous investment related
to innovations which require more capitalper worker.
However, it is also clear that the models inquestion contain important
elements and are capable of being expandedand improved, in particular by in-
corporating monetary factors.Indeed, Hicks (1950) added to his mainreal
model a monetary subsystem which couldaggravate some downturns.22Tobin's
1955 model has similar cycles but alsoexplicit roles for the supply ofmone-
tary assets and the inflexibility ofmoney wages.More recently, Laidler
(1973a) makes the desired capitalstock depend on the lagged real interest
rate as well as the lagged output, therebymodifying Hicks' equation for in-
duced investment so that it includesmonetary effects.Inflation expectations,
formed adaptively, appear ina Phillips-type relationship which complies with
the NRH but permits gradual price adjustments.This model retains an
accelerator-multiplier mechanism andcan generate fluctuations in output and
prices.However, unlike in Hicks, the cyclesare here damped, and exogenous
22See Hicks,1950, ohs. XI and XII.The "monetary complication" takes
the form of a cobweb cycle in the IS-LMspace, with rather complex lags and
nonlinearities.A quarter-century later, Hicks (197)4)revised his views,
stressing the need for greater relianceon monetary factors and autonomous
investment.—33—
changesin either the nominalinterest rate or autonomousexpenditures may be
required to move the economyoff either the floor ortheceiling.23
5.On Causes and Consequencesof Fluctuations inInventory Investmefl!
Inventories have a muchshorter expected life spanthan fixed capital and
can be adjustedmuch more quickly tothe desired levels.Nevertheless, the
success of attemptsat such adjustmentis by no meansassured as it depends
partly on accurate salesforecasts and partly onhow promptly production
reacts to unanticipatedsales changes.Some of the observedinventory
investment is planned, and someis unintended.
It is difficult to usestocks as a bufferprotecting output from the
variation in sales, exceptwhen the changes indemand are small andshort,
calling for no alterationflproduction.In the more persistentbusiness—
cycle movements,inventory investment tendsto be, on the contrary,
destabilizing, as shown by thealready noted fact thataggregate output fluc-
tuates more widely thanfinal sales.
An early andinfluential theory of inventorycycles was developed in
Metzler's multiplier_acceleratormodels (19141,19147).Here the desired level
of stocks of consumergoods varies withanticipated sales to consumerswhich
reflect sales observed inthe recent past.Output lags behindconsumption,
which is proportional tocontemporaneous income.An initial rise inthe level
of noninventOryinvestment, which is treated asautonomous,, depletes
inventories, hence businessmenattempt to increase them.But inventory
investment has the feedbackeffect of raising incomeand consumptiOn, which
reduces the stocks still more.This causes furtherrounds of increase in
23Laidler considers alternatively thenominal rate of interestand the
money stock as exogenous.Output is systematicallyrelated not to inflation
or deflation butto the rate of changein either.—3k—
inventoryinvestment, output, and sales.However, at some point during the
expansion the rates of increase in sales, and hence also in inventory
investment, will start falling.Declines in income and consumption will
ultimately result, reducing the desired stock levels.Again, the very efforts
to get rid of the unwanted stocks depress income and consumption further and
are thus temporarily self-defeating, but eventually the rate of decline in
sales and the disinvestment in stocks will begin to diminish, and an upturn in
income and consumption will initiate a new cycle.
Several papers report generally favorable tests of Met2ler's model based
on annual and quarterly data, mainly for the U.S. in the first two decades
after World War II (Coppock, 1959, 1962, 1965; Hillinger, 1966, 1979).The
periodicities are heavily concentrated in the 3—kyearsrange and are not
seriously disturbed by inclusion of random error terms, but there is substan-
tial damping.Anticipated values are derived from distributed lags (adaptive
expectations).The techniques include cyclical (NBER) measures, regression,
and spectral analyses.The hypothesis that fluctuations in non-farm business
inventory investment and nonresidential fixed investment are essentially
periodic, with cycles of about 3-5 and 7—10 years, respectively, has been
recently revived by Hillinger (1982, 1983).However, the unconventional
methods used in this work are subject to serious doubts and the results are
yet to be fully described andevaluated.24
Metzler's hypothesis, like other cyclical investment models of the
multiplier—accelerator type runs entirely in real terms and pays no attention
to price adjustments and monetary and financial factors.Also, it fits best
2kCyclesare estimated by cosine functions applied to residuals from
polynomial trends.The latter lack a theoretical rationale and are limited to
the period of estimation.The paucity of annual observations presents another
grave problem of statistical nature._35..
thefinished goods inventories subject to changes reflecting errorsin Sales
forecasts. But studies which disaggregate inventories by stageof fabrication
and type of production (Abramovitz, 1950; Stanback,1962; Lovell, 196L; Mack,
1967; Zarnowitz, 1973; Popkin, 1981) show that for good reasons the behavior
of stocks varies systematically between these categories.Thus finished
goods inventories are important primarily in production tostock; in
production to order, which plays a very large role in durable-goodsand
particularly capital—goods industries, inventories consist mainly ofgoods in
process which depend positively on the rate of output,and materials, which
are strongly influenced by cyclical changes insupply conditions (delivery
periods, availability).The stocks of materials can be promptly adjusted in
the ordering stage.Of course, it is difficult to allow for such details in
aggregative models but an important lesson here is that desired inventories
depend importantly on other variables in addition to sales.
6.TheRole of Changes in Prices, Costs, and Profits
In his 1913 volume, Mitchell linked the major changes in business acti-
vity to the outlook for profits or (in time of crisis) the questfor sol-
vency.Prospective profits depend on sales experience and expectations and on
the price—cost relation which is itself changing with the rate of employment
and capacity utilization.Business costs tend to rise faster than product
prices in the late stages of expansion, which depresses profit marginsand ex-
pectations.Accordingly, new investment commitments are curtailed well before
sales flatten.Income receipts and consumption expenditures weaken, inven-
tories pile up, and production cuts multiply, particularly in durable goods
industries.Pessismistic expectations spread and are confirmed and worsened
when output and employment turn down.In the contraction that follows,
similarly, price—cost margins and profits first deteriorate and thenimprove,—36—
excessstocks and other imbalances are gradually liquidated, and new investment
orders, sales, and output eventually revive.
When Mitchell first developed a theoretical account of these developments,
he had little empirical knowledge of them from the very inadequate data then in
existence.By now, however, there is much evidence that the relations he
stressed are generally consistent with the "stylized facts" discussed in part II
above (on their validity see Fabricant, 1959; Hultgren, 1950, 1965; Kuh, 1960;
Moore, 1962, 1975; Zarnowitz, 1973; Moore and Cullity 1983; Boehm, 1982).What
is particularly well established and important is the typically procyclical but
lagging pattern in labor costs per unit of output, which reflects primarily the
positive conformity and leadtimes of labor productivity (output per hour of
work).Real wages, on the other hand, normally do not show large deviations
from trend that are consistently associated with businesscycles.25
In a 1967 model of Rose, employment and labor supply fluctuate relative to
the stock of capital which grows with net investment.The rates of change in
wages (w) and prices (p) are equal in the long-run equilibrium but differ in the
short run reflecting these fluctuations.During a recession, the ratio of labor
supply to capital increases, the rate of employment falls, and prices start
rising faster than wages.The improvement in profitability leads to an upturn in
the rate of employment.During the recovery, the condition p >wpersists, but
25Countercyclical movements in real wages are implied by the classical
marginal productivity theory of the demand for labor, which was accepted by
Keynes, and they are also suggested by the view that prices generally are more
flexible and procyclical than money wages.However, the evidence is mixed and
not conclusive:it varies with the choice of the deflator, the character-
istics of the period covered, methods and dates (e.g., the intracycle changes
may not show up well in regressions with annual series).A few studies favor
the countercyclical hypothesis (Neftci, 1978; Sargent, 1978), but there is
more support for either procyclical behavior (Dunlop, 1938; Tarshis, 1939;
Modigliani, 1977; Stockman, 1983) or no significant relationship between real
wages and employment (Kuh, 1966; Bodkin, 1969; Geary and Kennan, 1982).-37—
graduallyinvestment revives and growth of capital accelerates.First employment
and then capital start growing faster thanthe labor supply.The upswing
eventually causes wages to overtake prices.In the new phase where p < w, the
profit rate and the employment-capital ratio turndown.Investment is reduced,
the rate of employment declines, and a newrecession begins.
The model has debatable implications for thereal wage movements and its
shortcomings are apparent given the lessons of therecent inflationaryera.26But
all formal models are heavily restricted andthe aspect covered here, namely the
cyclical role of changes in the relative input/outputprices, is important enough
to make the attempt interesting.Earlier theories of this type, although not
worked out mathematically, are in some respectsbroader and moresatisfactory.2'1'
The price-cost-profit nexus can and should becombined with monetary ele-
ments, since, as stressed by Mitchell, businesscycles arise only in a "money
economy" in its late stage of development and areincompatible with pure barter.
(For one interesting attempt in this direction, see Rose,1969).In moderate
cycles, the effective limit on the volume oftransactions is set by demand,
whereasin "intense booms" a higher limit of monetarynatureisreached.28
26underperfect competition, Rose's hypothesis has real wagesincreasing
in the boom and early contraction, decreasing inlate contraction and re-
covery.Under imperfect competition, however, real wagescould be either
invariant or procyclical, depending on the elasticitiesof demand and marginal
costs.A single nonlinear Phillips wage-employment curveis involved; shifts
in it would have to be introduced, lest the model beapplicable at best to a
short period before any endogenous expectations ofinflation changes develop
and take effect.
27Krelle, 1981, shows the similarity of Rose's theory to that of Preiser,
1933.The main difference is that Preiser had a two-sector(consumer-goods,
producer-goods) model, whereas Rose has a simpler one-sectormodel.
28For example, an expansion can be halted by the constraint on a further
rise in bank credit imposed by the gold standard, asin Hawtrey (Mitchell, 1927,
oh. 2).On Mitchell's efforts to synthesize real, monetary,and expectational
factors in viewing both the causes and effects ofbusiness cycles, see Friedman,
1952, and Zarnowitz, 1968 and 1972.-38-
IV.Theoriesof Cyclical Response to Monetary and Real Disturbances
1.Exogenous Factors, Stochastic Elements, and Types of Theory
Part III discussed mainly the work of economists who attribute business
cycles to the modus operandi of industrialized private-enterprise economies.
Here the cycle itself is the principal source of the stresses and imbalances
that keep it going.A nonlinear model that requires only a single initial
disturbance to produce self—sustaining cycles has maximum endogeneity.29
In reality, of course, the economy is always influenced by outside factors
(e.g., weather) so that a comprehensive explanation of its motioncannot be
purely endogenous.But no outside influences can by themselves produce the
recurrent sequences of expansions and contractions; this presumably requires in
the first place the particular dynamics of an interdependent economicsystem.A
really satisfactory theory, therefore, should explain how business cyclesare
generated by the internal mechanism of an economy exposed to the impact ofa
great many potentially relevant external events.What matters, then, is the
relative role of the inside and outside factors, not the extremecases.
Nevertheless, a mainly endogenous model of business cycles differs in principle
sharply from a mainly exogenous one.
The specific events and variables that are usually treatedas exogenous
include wars, changes in population, technology, weather, governmentspending,
tax laws, etc.They clearly can and often do have major exonomicconsequences
that affect cyclical behavior.In addition to these factors which usually show
29Fluctuations thatare neither damped nor explosive but self-sustaining
are simply not credible in linear models.It would be extremely unlikely,
e.g., for the accelerator always to assume that precise middle value which is
needed to keep the system in a constant cycle.With random shocks imposed
upon such a model, the cycles would increase over time (Saznuelson,19147,pp.
268—269).This does not apply to nonlinear models whichcan produce recurrent
cycles with bounded variances, as shown for a Kaldor-type modelby Klein and
Preston (1969).—39—
considerablepersistence over time (are seriallycorrelated), there are also the
random shocks --uncorrelateddisturbances of various kinds whichimpinge upon
the structure of economicrelationships.Both the white noise and the
identifiable exogenous factors playimportant roles in the early, linearand
dynamically stable model by Frisch(1933).Here a low value for the accelerator
is assumed but also a sufficientlyclose succession of erraticimpulses which
keep the system fluctuating.That is, the response of the economyto random but
continual disturbances is such thatwhat would be otherwise damped(fading)
oscillations are converted into therecurrent business cycles.This hypothesis
(which was suggested earlier byWicksell and Slutsky) gained muchrecognition in
recent theoretical writings andparticularly influenced the work of
macroeconometriC model builders.
Several econometric models of the U.S. economyin the post-World War II
period have been found generallynoncyclical in the absence of outside
disturbances, as shown by simulationstudies (Adelman, 1959; Hickman,1972).
But random shocks applied to the morerecent quarterly models proved to be
insufficient to generate movements withthe observable cyclical properties;to
induce fluctuations in these models,it was necessary to use seriallycorrelated
disturbances (Zarnowitz, Boschan, andMoore, 1972; Howrey, 1972).Moreover,
even the best simulationsshow only residual cyclical elements,much weaker that
those found in the historicalseries used in the estimation of themodels.This
could be due to errors in either thestructure of the models or theestimates of
the disturbances orboth.3°
It should be noted that the largemacroeconometric models used primarily
30me models estimate as constant parameters that may well varywith
changes in policy regimes (Lucas,1976), the structure of the economy,and
major departures from averagecyclical patterns.Models estimated with data
from periods with mild businesscycles such as those of the 1950sand 1960s
are known to be unable toreproduce much more violent fluctuationssuch as
those of the 1930s (Zeliner andPeck, 1973).-140-
for short-term forecasting are frequently and extensively revised, and the more
recent versions of them may well be substantially more cyclical.Simulation of
one commercially successful model suggest that random noise from equation errors
accounts for only 7% of an overall measure of "cyclicality" and that some two
thirds of the latter would remain even with stable monetary policy, no financial
disintermediation "crunches", and no oil price shocks (Eckstein and Sinai,
19814).
The validity of the evidence from macroeconometric models which appear to
refute the endogenous cycle and favor the random shock theory is for these and
other reasons open to doubts.Thus Blatt (1978) constructed artificial time
series on income, consumption, and investment based on Hicks' model with a high
accelerator implying unstable behavior.An econometric analysis of these data
shows that they are seemingly well explained by a linear model with random
shocks, which has a low accelerator yielding stable conditions.The problem is
attributed to the limitations of linear models (Hicks' theory is essentially
nonlinear)31
Business cycles interact with long-term trends in varied and subtle ways so
the separation of the two is difficult conceptually and empirically (Zarnowitz,
1981).Decompositions using purely deterministic (say, log-linear) trends
ignore such interactions, e.g., the imprint that major cycles leave on the
growth rates for some considerable time.Cyclical analyses based on deviations
from such trends are suspect on statistical grounds (Nelson and Plosser,
1982).The proposed alternative is to use stochastic trends approximated by
3'Further, Blatt (1980)argues that the random shock theory is
inconsistent with the evidence that deviations of many economic time series
from smooth long-term trends show a pronounced asymmetry:the rises tend to
be longer than the declines and also smaller per unit period.The measures
are based on long monthly time series examined in trend—adjusted form by Burns
and Mitchell (19146,ch.7).—)41—
randomwalks, but this means inpractice that most of thecontractions as well
as expansions areincluded in such trendconstructs, whereas theresidual
components labeled the"cycle" are largely purenoise (Beveridge andNelson,
1981).There is no good economictheory to justify this wayof looking at the
world.
The regularities reviewedin part II of this papercannot be reconciled
with the suggestion madeby Irving Fisher in1925 and revived byMcCulloch
(1975, p. 303) that businesscycles resemble "the cyclessuperstitious gamblers
believe they can discernin their luck at casinoslike the ne at Monte
Carlo."As shown by MoCulloch, oncean expansion orcontraction has exceeded
its minimum historicalduration, the probabilityof its being reversed in a
given month is independentof its age.But that is merely aproof of
nonperiodicitY, not of randomness,of the fluctuations called"business
cycles."Endogenous processes canstill bring about the downturnsand upturns,
but they interact withall types of random andserially correlated outside
events, which makes thetiming of the reversalsunpredictable (cf. Matthews,
1959, pp.199_205).32
Certainly, the processes andrelations economists study arein general
stochastic, and purelydeterministic explanations ofmacroeconomic movements
cannot be sufficient.But purely stochasticexplanations have notheoretical
content, and it is the factorswhich can be integrated in aneconomic theory
that are naturally ofprimary interest to anyeconomist who attempts to
understand the nature and causesof business cycles.
32Sueh processes include those arising fromparticular historical and in-
stitutional developments, e.g.,the "misintermediation"practice of banks and
thrift institutions whichMcCulloch elsewhere (1977,1981) asserts are a cause of
financial instability andrecurrent, if non-periodic,business fluctuations.
Similarly, Irving Fischer'sdebt-deflation hypothesis of the1930s treats the
business cycle problem much moreseriously than his writingsin the 1920s.In the generally prosperous times after World War II, however, business
cycles slipped way down in the public and professional interest.The weight of
the public sector increased greatly throughout the industralized world, and
government actions and policies attracted growing attention as a likelysource
of large macroeconomic effects, notably the rising inflation.The idea that
business contractions are also policy-induced and episodic rather thana part of
self-sustaining cycles seemed increasingly plausible.
Even while the style of macroeconomic analysis and policy remained
predominantly "Keynesian," the theory soon veered sharplyaway from the unstable
accelerator-multiplier models to concepts that imputed much more stability to
the private sector.This evolution shows up strongly in Duesenberry (1958).
The notion of strong cyclical effects from high values of the acceleratorand
multiplier was further deflated by new theoretical developments:the permanent
income and life cycle hypotheses of consumption and the "neoclassical" models of
investment.Used along with adaptive expectations reacting but gradually to
past events, these formulations suggested relatively stable trends in private
demands.The rise of monetarism (see next section) worked in thesame
direction.
Historically, the main substantive differences among, the theories centered
on the relative importance of real vs. monetary factors.This can be linked to
the the distinction between the impulses and the propagation mechanism,
introduced formally by Frisch in 1933.There can be models with monetary shocks
and real propagation, models with real shocks and monetary propagation, and
various mixtures of'thetwo.Even in the largely endogenous theories it is
331n this relativelydisaggregate and complex theory, growth is explained
by the interaction of a capital-adjustment process with autonomous investment,
downturns by the operation of'variousexogenous factors, and upturns by the
corrective forces inherent in the basically stable system._143_
sometimespossible to differentiate in a somewhat similar manner betweenthe
mainly origthating factors and the mainly conditioning orresponsive factors.314
In sum, the several dichotomies encountered in modernbusiness-cycle
dynamics intersect in various ways, and the extant theoriesactually represent
many of the possible resulting combinations.They generally resist being neatly
characterized by these categories, but even attempts at approximations canbe
instructive.A few illustrations for some theories lightly treated above are
given in Table 5 (see the first four cases; the others refer tomaterials to be
discussed later).
2.The Monetarist Interpretation of Business Fluctuations
In the 1960s, the rise of monetarism mounted a frontal challenge to
Keynesian economics, starting from the simple quantity-theoreticproposition:
Changes in the stock of money are the main determinant of changes innominal
income.The demand for money is a relatively stable function linking real
balances to wealth or permanent income and to expected rates of return on money
and alternative assets.Given significant lags in wage and price adjustments,
sequences of alternating phases of'highand low growth rates in the quantity of
money lead to corresponding fluctuations in aggregatedemand and real economic
activity relative to the secular trends.Sufficiently long periods of low but
predominantly positive monetary growth rates are likely to produce business
slowdowns or recessions; sufficiently long periods of negative monetarygrowth
rates lead to depressions (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a andb).35
314me idea is found in Pigou, 1927,p. 8.Hansen(196'4, chs.17 and 18)
applies it to the work by Wicksell, Aftalion, Pigou, and J. H. Clark.
350f course, monetarism (like Keynesianism) has come to denote a broad
assortment of theoretical concepts and empirical propositions attributedto
economists who agree in some respects and disagree in others.Here there is
need only for a selective treatment of these characteristics inasmuch asthey
bear on the evolution of the work on business cycles.(For comprehensive






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The lags of output behind the monetary changes areseen as variable but on
the average iengthy.This is so because, say, an acceleratedincrease in the
quantity of money must first alter the relativeprices or yields on a broad
range of assets.The resulting discrepancies between theactual and the desired
portfolios prompt the banks and the public to takecorrective actions.The
stimulus would eventually spread to product markets,causing rises in payments
for services of, and the investments in,nonfinancial assets.As spending,
income, and prices rise, interest rateswill snap back from their earlier
decline.If price expectations are adaptive, i.e., subjectto lagged error
corrections, people will tend to underestimate therising prices and hence
overestimate their real money balances for some time.This will induce more
transitory spending to liquidate the extra amountsof "redundant" money, and in
the process the rates of rise in prices andnominal income will overshoot the
new equilibrium paths for thesevariables.6Thus, even in the case of a single
shock, some cyclical (presumably damped) reaction maywell occur.
The rate of growth of output or real incomecorresponding to full
employment (or the "natural unemployment rate") is exogenousin this model,
being determined by real factors.The monetarist theory of macroeconomic
fluctuations deals with deviations of output fromthis trend, that is, with
"growth cycles.
6These paths would run parallel but higher than the new equilibrium path
for the money stock, because at a higher rateof price rise less money in real
terms would be demanded relative to wealth andincome.See Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963a, and Friedman, 1970.
37me equilibrium or trend level of output in this sense is associated
with less than full utilization of resources; henceit can be either higher or
lower than the actual level of output at anytime.This is unlike the concept
of a "ceiling" imposed on output by full employment(as in Hicks, 1950).The early and still influential versions of this theory, due largely to
Friedman, treat monetary changes —-growthrates or deviations from trend of
the quantity of money --asif they were predominantly autonomous, i.e.,
having strong one-way effects on movements in total spending, income, and
output.The reverse effects, from business activity to money, are recognized
to exist but only as secondary "feedbacks."The main source of critical
monetary disturbances is thus located outside the private economy, in policy
actions and institutional changes.Private expenditures, including business
investment, are viewed as essentially stable, except when affected by the
money shocks:when undisturbed, they tend in real terms to be consistent with
the natural rates of employment and output.
This is a new emphasis.Earlier monetary theories generally gave most
attention to private sector instabilities, particularly credit fluctuations.
The differences are highlighted in Table 5 above (see also section 111—i
passim).
This brings us to the subject of the determinants of money supply.Under
the present fiduciary standard, money consists of currency and, mainly, depos-
its in private banks.Monetary authorities can affect the quantity of money
only indirectly and over time, by trying to control the monetary base (bank
reserves plus currency).Subject to legal or regulatory constraints, banks
vary their reserve-to-deposits ratios and the public their currency-to—
deposits ratios in response to actual and expected changes in interest rates,
real income, and probably some other indicators, e.g., those of business and
consumer confidence.In principle, then, a supply function for money in
nominal units can be derived, involving the policy-related base and a few
endogerious determinants of'themoney multiplier (ratio of the money stock to
the base).The stability of this function is an empirical question on which_L7_
thereis significant disagreement.8However, there is a substantial
consensus, not only among monetarists, that any effects that interest rates,
wealth, or -income may have on the nominal money supply are much weaker and
less consistent than the effects of these variables on the demand for real
balances.Moreover, monetarist studies argue that central banks have the
power and tools to exercise the dominant influence upon the money stock,
except in the very short run.
The potential for an autonomous monetary policy is generally overesti-
mated by analysts who concentrate on United States, the only large market
economy in which balance-of-payments considerations could long be treated as
secondary even under fixed exchange rates.For any small economy under this
regime, the nominal money supply depends on changes in the available foreign
exchange reserves, must tend to be consistent with prices and incomes that
will balance the country's international payments, and hence cannot be deter-
mined independently by domestic authorities.Under the gold standard, a
business expansion would come to a halt when the drain of cash and shortage of
gold reserves forced the banking system to curtail credit on a sufficiently
large scale.This was the ultimate source of the relatively large and regular
British cycles in the 19th century to Marshall, Hawtrey, and Lavington.
An early expectation that the monetarist approach may ultimately produce
a theory of "a partly self-generating cyclical mechanism ...includinga
38Cagan, 1965, shows that high-poweredmoney fluctuated more erratically
than, and often opposite to, the currency and reserve ratios.One source of
the interrelation is indirect—-common response to business cycles—-another
direct-—central bank operations designed to stabilize the economy.He finds
that "the dependence of the money stock on prices and business activity, as
well as on other variables, is strong but is neither rigid, uniform, nor
immediate" (p.16).Friedman stresses that "neither interest rates nor real
income have a consistent and sizable influence on the nominal quantity of
money supplied" (1982, p. 35).Onthe other hand, Brunner and Meltzer argue
that an empirically stable money-supply function exists (1968, 1972).-8-
feedbackin the rate of change in money itself"(Friedman and Schwartz,
1963a, p.64) has remained unfulfilled.The feedback or "reflex influence"
running from business activity to monetary growth has not been analytically
developed and integrated into a theory of how money, prIces, and real factors
interact in the short run.The approach produced instead an essentially
exogenous and monetary model of the business cycle.Yet the same studies that
show an important independent role of money, particularly in major infla-
tionary booms and severe deflationary slumps, also find much evidencethat
fluctuations in the monetary variables reflect those in realaggregates,
particularly in mild cycles (for a summary, see Cagan, 1965,p. 29L).The
primacy of the monetary effects cannot be established by the lessthan compelling
argument that, since money plays a key role in the major cycles, it shouldalso be
important in the minor cycles which are just "less virulent membersof the same
species" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a,p. 55).
The idea that cyclical instability is mainly policy—induced isnot an integral
part of, or a necessary inference from, the monetarist theory.It is an empirical
judgment held by some monetarists as well as other economists.39The popularity of
this view rose in the late 1960s and 1970s, when both inflationand unemployment
drifted upward, the Phillips curve moved north-to—northeast througha series of
clockwise cycle-related loops, and failures of attempted stabilizationpolicies were
evident.Rather paradoxically, the 1970s also witnessed the culmination of the
belief in the power of macroeconomic policies in form of theconcept of a "political
39Consider the followingstatement by authors who contributed much to the
development of the money supply function:"Our version of monetarism does not
deny that if exogenous shocks take the form of governmentpolicies, including
fiscal policies, the system may oscillateor even explode into inflation or
cumulative deflation.Our proposition asserts that cyclical instability is
mainly the product of government policies thatare imposed on a stabilizing
private sector" (Brunner and Meltzer, in J. Stein, ed., 1976,p. 180)._L9_
businesscycle," which is not of monetaristorigin.40
Monetarist models can acquire some cyclical dynamics bycombining an
expectationsaUgmented Phillips curve with the quantity-theoreticdemand for money
function.Laidler (1973b) presents an intentionally verysimple model of this type,
with exogenous monetary growth and thefull-employment output rate, and adaptive
expectations of inflation.The causation runs from lagged and current moneygrowth
rates and current inflation to the change inoutput, then back to inflation, and so
on, recursively.The model generates a cyclical movement in outputand inflation
(relative to their natural and expected values,respectively) in response to a
single shift in the rate of monetary expansion.Laidler notes that its simulations
leave much to be desired, probably in large part becauseof the missing variables,
particularly the interestrate.4
3.PriceMisperceptions and Intertemporal Substitution of Labor
Adaptive expectations often imply long lags of adjustmentand persistence
of apparently systematic errors.Critics regard models that yield such
results as ad hoc and inconsistent with optimizingbehavior.They accept
instead the view that "expectations are essentially the same asthe predic-
tions of the relevant economic theory" (Muth,1961, p. 316).Application of
this "rational expectations" hypothesis (REH) tomacroeconomics was part of a
40The political models of business cycles maintain several strong and
questionable assumptions.(1) Policymakers know the structure of the economy,the
public does not.(2) The inflation-unemployment short-run tradeoff can beexploited
effectively by the party in power.(3)Votersare myopic and concerned with the
current electoral period only.Thus the government is capable of fine-tuning the
economy periodically.It is not surprising that these models, thoughingenious,
find little support in facts:the related evidence is mixed and generally
inconclusive.See Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; MacRae, 1977;also, Fels, 1977;
Moore, 1977a; and Tufte, 1978.A very useful, balanced overview is given in Altand
Chrystal, 1983; see especially, ch. 5.
Fora corresponding theoretical analysisof a model for a small open economy
under fixed exchange rates, see Laidler, 1975, ch. 9.-50-
new ambitious program of work undertaken in the 1970s by several economists
following the initiative of Lucas, 1972.The objective was to develop a
general business—cycle theory in strict adherence to the basic principles of
the analysis of economic equilibrium:consistent pursuit of self-interest by
individuals and continuous clearing of all markets by relative prices.42
Under RE}-{, the route of the older monetarist theory which used adaptive
expectations to help explain the duration of cyclical movements is fore-
closed.Expectations are now taken to be free of any bias and subject to
random errors only.All persistent monetary changes, inasmuch as they are
predictable, will be correctly anticipated and met directly by proportional
changes in prices and related nominal variables.Only random monetary
impulses can lead to price surprises and miscalculations which, in this view,
are necesssary to explain any cyclical movements in real variables.
The short-run aggregate supply function for labor (Lucas and Rapping,
1969) is upward-sloping relative to the deviations of the current level of
real wages from their expected (discounted future) level.It is seen as
typically elastic, reflecting strong competitive incentives to take advantage
of temporarily higher rates of real return.Since the substitutability of
leisure over time is high, a small change in the return on the current work
effort can induce a large change, in the same direction, in the amount of work
done.This intertemporal substitution hypothesis (ISH) plays a central role
in the recent attempts to explain employment fluctuations as an aggregate
result of individual choices on the supply side of the labor market.
42Lucas,1973, 1975, 1977; Sargent and Wallace, 1975, 1976; Sargent, 1976a;
Barro, 1976, 1980b; Lucas and Sargent, 1978.Lucas, 1977, p. 7, cites Hayetc,
1933, as an "intellectual ancestor" who posed the problem of explaining the
business cycle as part, not a contradiction, of the equilibrium, theory.This
was indeed Hayek's intent, but it is also correct to characterize his solution
as a theory of monetary disequilibrium and an unstable cumulative process, with
excessive credit creation causing distortions of relative prices and the
structure of production (as Hayek, 1932, 1933, are commonly interpreted).-51-
By an analogous argument,firms are expected to varytheir output
positively in response to transitorychanges in their sellingprices, provided
that these are seen as relative orreal price changes and notequated with
general inflation.But they would likewise varytheir output inversely in
response to transitory changesin the relative prices oftheir inputs,
including in particular labor.The basic equilibrium modelof business cycles
disregards this complication bysimply combining workers andfirms into a
single group.The representativeworker_entrepreneur then generallysupplies
more (less) of bothlabor and output when facedwith an unanticipated rise
(fall) in his selling price.
This approach, by eliminatingother prime suspects ofearlier business—
cycle theories (including realdisturbances, which are viewed asdispersed and
localized) places a heavy explanatoryburden on a single causal chain:random
monetary shocks induce pricemisperceptions which induce wrongproduction de-
cisions.By assumption, prices otherthan those in one's own market areknown
to anyone only with a lagof one unit period ofunspecified length.Agents
have complete and timely localinformation but only incompleteand lagging
information about other "island"markets (Phelps, 1970) and abouteconomy-wide
aggregates such as the money stockand the overall price level.Suppose now
that an unanticipatedacceleration in monetary growth occurs,raising prices
in general; then therepresentative worker_entrepreneurfirst observes a
higher selling price than heexpected, takes it to be in somepart a temporary
increase in his relative price orreal rate of return, and raiseshis output
in accordance with the ISH.These reactions prevail wheneverthe observed
prices turn out to be higher thanthe level most producershad expected on the
basis of previous information.In the opposite situationof prices having
proved lower than expected, outputis on the average reduced.The random—52—
forecasting errors are unavoidable andcan be recognized only in time, after
the outside price data becomes available.However, by then many erroneous
decisions will already have been taken, and thenecessary revisions and
corrections, too, will involve time and costs.
The model of the "representative producer,"with its fusion of worker and
employer, assumes that labor and business recognizethat their interests
generally coincide, or at least actas if they did.This is not consistent
with the strong evidence of significantpatterns of cyclical behavior in cost—
price-profit relationships (see part II andsection 111—5 above).These
observations can best be interpretedon the common—sense assumption that firms
and workers pursue their own interests inreacting rationally to changing
business and labor market conditions.3
The issue of the relative timing of outputprices vs. input costs can be
reduced to an informational problem ina number of ways.It might be assumed that
firms have prompter knowledge of pricechanges than workers or, more generally,
that the representative producer unit (firmor worker) knows the prices of things
it sells better than the prices of thingsit buys (cf. Friedman, 1968).If so,
then inflation will be stimulative becauseit is largely unanticipated by workers
or buyers (or, which is much the same, because it isrecognized sooner in output
prices than in input costs).Some critics view any of these assumed informational
asymmetries as arbitrary specifications (B.Friedman, 1978,p. 76;Tobin,1980, p.
42).
The equilibrium approach to businesscycles can be explained well in general
terms (Lucas, 1977) and restated simply(see the text above and the capsule
3To besure, the interests of workers and employersmay coincide in some
respects and are reconciled in negotiatedor implicit contracts (see section IV-
7(3) below).—53—
description in Table 5).The individual models based on the REH and the ISH,
however, are much too diverse, experimental, and complex to lend themselves to
such verbal summarization.Some of them use changes in current prices relative to
the next period's expected price level to induce intertemporal substitution on the
supply side (Lucas 1972, 1973; Sargent and Wallace, 1975).Others allow for the
existence of assets that earn a nominal interest rate and add that rate to the
above price surprise term to obtain a measure of anticipated one-period real rate
of return.This relative price variable then appears with a positive sign as a
determinant of supply and with a negative sign as a determinant of demand
(Barro, 1980a and
The general criticism of the price—misperception hypothesis is that it
requires long informational lags which are even less likely under rational than
under adaptive expectations.Ample, frequent, and low-cost monetary and price
statistics are now available, so informational confusion of the type here
hypothesized can at most be short-lived and associated with random changes, not
persistent cyclical fluctuations, in output and employment (Hall, 1975, 1980a;
Tobin, 1977; Modigliani, 1977).True, this argument is partly countered by the
observation that there are indeed serious deficiencies in these and other impor-
tant data on the economy, which in many cases are reduced only througha time-
consuming sequence of revisions.This can distort initial expectations and
delay successful signal detection for several months (Zarnowitz, 1982).Still,
informational lags are surely much shorter than the average cyclical movements,
so they cannot alone account for the duration of the observed fluctuations
(Okun, 1980) or, one may add, for the large size procyclical fluctuations in
corporate profits and stock prices.Beginning with an economy at full
The net effect ofa rise in this composite variable, then, will be to
stimulate output if, on the aggregate across the markets, the induced increase in
supply is larger than the induced decrease in demand.This formulation takes into
account the debate about the direction of informational asymmetries noted in the
preceding paragraph of the text._51_
empioyment,most errors caused by temporary misperceptions of monetary and
price changes would be detected and corrected before they could give rise to
large cumulative income movements in either direction.Finally, the knowledge
of the nominal interest rates, a set of timely and global variables, may convey
information about the unobserved part of money growth (King, 1983;Barro,
1980b).6
The criticism of the ISH centers on observations said to be inconsistent
with continuous equilibrium in the labor market (see, e.g., Okun, 1980).Thus
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separationsaccount for most of the rise in unemployment.More people are
looking for work at current (or even lower) wages over longer average time
periods.Fewer people quit their jobs as vacancies drop.
General critiques, however, have limited power of persuasion, particularly
against strong priors of the economic equilibrium theory.It is therefore
particularly important that the hypotheses under consideration have been
subjected to various tests, in large part by their proponents.
In one set of tests, the reaction function of'monetaryauthorities was
estimated by regressing the rate of growth in money on its own past values and
selected lagged variables, and identifying the residuals from this regression
with the "unanticipated" component of monetary change (Barro, 1977a, 1978; Barro
and Rush, 1980).These tests could not reject the joint hypotheses of
rationality and neutrality of money, but many doubts were raised about the
specification and identifiability of'Barro'sreaction function as well as its
5it isagainst the spirit of the new equilibrium theory (and some older
scholars such as Hayek and other Austrians) to start an attempted explanation
of business cycles from postulating an initial state of recession.
146Thisprompts Barro (1981, p. 51) to observe that the "stress on
confusions between temporary and permanent monetary shocks has been over-
done.The real effects of temporary, but perceived, money shocks would be
eliminated by the appropriate adjustment in the nominal rate of return."-55—
consistency with private and public rationalbehavior.7
The neutrality hypothesis that anticipated money growth has no real effects
is strongly rejected by tests reported in Mishkin (1982).Here anticipated as
well unanticipated money growth influence output and unemployment with lags of
up to 20quarters.8
Data on monetary aggregates are available promptly and often (now weekly)
but they are also repeatedly revised.The revisions are frequently large
relative to the average rates of money growth but they appear to be on the whole
random.Economic agents should not be assumed to be ignorant of the current
monetary values for which they do have usable approximations.And, contrary to
the RE-IS models in which prices are fully flexible, output is in fact
positively associated with these measured and knowable values of the money stock
(King, 1981; Boschen and Grossman, 1982; McCallum, 1982).
The early tests by Lucas and Rapping (1969) favor the ISH but they are
based on adaptive expectations.When re-estimated by Altonji (1982) under
rational expectations and a variety of alternative assumptions about agents'
information sets, the results generally fail to support the ISH.49Weak
negative effects of a price surprise term on the unemployment rate are reported
the comments by Blinder, H. J.Gordon,R. Weintraub, and Fischer in
S. Fischer, ed., 1980, pp. 49-72 and 219-221.On the related basic problems
of "observational equivalence" and testability, see also Sargent, 1976b, and
Sims, 198Oa.
is these longer lags that are primarily responsible for Mishkin's
conclusion being the opposite of that reached in the Barro papers, where lags
of two years or ten quarters are used.No attempts to rationalize the
persistence of such long distributed lags under the REH are made in any of
these reports.See also Nelson, 1981, on the dependence of unemployment on
lagged values of nominal GNP.
9"For most specifications, the current realwage, the expected future
real wage, and the expected real rate of interest are either insignificantly
related to unemployment and labour supply or have the wrong sign" (Altonji,
op. cit., p. 78L).See also Altonji and Asherifelter, 1980.-56—
inSargent (1976a) but disputed in Fair (1979); there are simultaneity problems
with these estimates, as shown in Barro (1980a).These and other tests (Hall,
1979) are admitted to be rudimentary and on the whole inconclusive; all
participants in this work stress that it presents great difficulties.Still
other recent tests addressed to certain manageable aspects of the problem have
produced for the most part negative results (Clark and Summers, 1982; Mankiw,
Rottemberg, and Summers, 1982).
To sumup,the evidence can be fairly described as being on balance un-
favorable to the theories here considered.This has led to some reassessments
on the part of their authors.Thus Barro (1981, p. 74)expresses"doubts
about the explanatory value for business cycles of currently available
equilibrium theories."50MeCalluin, 1982, p. 4.,arguesthat the evidence
requires the abandonment of "flexible-price equilibrium models" but not of the
"equilibrium approach to macroeconomic analysis," which can rationalize sticky
or slowly-adjusting wages and prices.
4.Cyclical Persistence and Extensions of the Equilibrium Models
Can random monetary shocks produce persistent fluctuations of'realaggre-
gates in an economy with market clearing and incomplete information?Those
who deny it attack mainly the ISH as leading to misguided attempts to
represent business cycles as a "moving equilibrium" (Modigliani, 1977; Tobin,
1977, 1980; Solow, 1980).Some expect that the postulate of continuous
marketing clearing will have to be abandoned in the RE models (Okun, 1980;
Gordon, 1981).
50He hastens to add that thesedoubts "do not constitute support for
Keynesian disequilibrium analysis," which is incomplete and even more
questionable.His argument implies that there are only two sides to the
debate, the "new classical macroeconomics' and "Keynesian macroeconomics."
This is a widespread but mistaken and, in my opinion, much too restrictive
point of view.—57-
Theequilibrium theorists recognize that the basicingredients of their
models are not sufficient to produce thepersistent movements in output and
employment -which occur during the business cycle.However, they point out
that random shocks to aggregate demand can beconverted into persistent
movements by suitable propagation mechanisms, as inFrisch, 1933.Further,
Lucas and Sargent (1978, pp. 65-67)arguethat some devices of this type have
already been incorporated in the equilibriummodels and others are likely to
be developed.
The first of these propagation mechanisms relatesto the familiar
observation that rapid adjustments of the rates ofemployment and production
are costly.Accordingly, firms respond with lags to the relativeprice
signals theyperceive.51In practice, modeling the cost-of-adjustment effects
takes the form of making the demands for factorsàf production depend partly
on their own lagged values. it isimportant to note that this mechanism is
entirely different from and extraneous to that of therandom price-mispercep-
tion effects.The latter should not be spread over time by the olddevice of
distributed lags.The unit period here is defined by the lag of data onthe
nominal aggregates which was already shown to berelatively short.The logic
of this approach seems to leave no good reasons forextending the lag to more
than one period and so opening up the possibilityof autocorrelated forecast
errors.Cost-of-adjustment models may provide a rationale for morecomplex
and longer lags.However, in a world without uncertainty about the
probability distributions governing the future (see nextsection), where
markets clear continuously leaving no unexploitedopportunities for gain,
51It should be noted that such lags could also rationalize a dynamic
model of fluctuations in employment and output that ispurely "real", i.e.,
independent of'thebehavior of money and prices (see Sargent, 1979, pp.370-
379).-58-
thereshould be little groundfor any sizable distributedlags in economic
decision making (cf. Poole,1976).
Another propagationdevice incorporatesa form of an investment accel-
erator (Lucas, 1975).Positive price surprisesinduce not only increasesin
current employment and outputbut also acquisition ofadditional capital.
Capacity is supposed toincrease promptly duringthe period when the natureof
the shock is not yetrecognized.This increment to thestock of capacity
raises labor productivityand temporarily increasesthe demand for labor and
the supply of commodities;it also retards thegeneral price increase, thereby
delaying the recognitionof, or adjustment to,the initial shock.Thus a
persistence effect iscreated.
This formulation alsoposes some major problems.Many capital investment
projects involve indivisibilities,high costs and risks,and gestation periods
measured in years andquarters, not months.They are unlikely to bedecided
upon isolated signals thatcould well prove falseafter a short information
lag (cf. Gordon, 1981,p. 510).Not surprisingly, randommonetary
disturbances and pricemisperceptions have notattracted much attention inthe
literature as potentiallyimportant determinantsof investment; instead,
expectations based onsystematic changes in demand,profits, credit, and cost
of capital have.Neglect of these factorsdeprives the treatment ofbusiness
capital investment inthis class of models ofmuch interest.
Furthermore, because ofthe relatively long orderingand construction lags,
investment will tendto add to demand beforeit adds to capacity.The effects
of increased capacityon supply, prices, and theanticipated real rate of return
on capital are delayed.it must be recalled,too, that capacity itselfnormally
continues to increase duringrecessions; it is investmentand the rate of capac-
ity utilization thatare highly sensitive cyclically.In models thatconcen--59—
trate on monetary andprice effects on the stockof capital which is presumably
optimally utilized throughout(as is the stock oflabor), the role of the
reformulated "accelerator" would seemto be quite limited.
In models with lagginginformation, the effects ofpurely random
monetary-price shocks do not cumulate:the responses peak in thefirst period
and decline graduallythereafter (Lucas, 1975, p.202).- This feature is not
changed by the introductionof investment as long as newcapital is installed
with a lag of one periodonly.But these timing specificationsare very
unrealistic.There is strong evidencethat on the average investmentin plant
and equipment requiresabout seven quarters tocomplete, with few projects
taking less than one year(Mayer, 1960; Zarnowitz, 1973, pp.505—519; Hall,
1977).
Kydland and Prescott (1980,1982) use the "time to build" newcapital
stocks as a feature oftechnology which dictates thenumber of periods needed
to produce durable producerand consumer goods.These lags are treated as
pOlicy-invariant and constant for agiven type of capital.(This is unlike
the observed delivery lags onthese goods which varyprocyclically with back-
logs of orders; see Popkin,1965; Zarnowitz, 1973, part III;Carlton, 1979.)
Time to build contributes tothe persistence of outputmovements over the
multiple periods required toproduce the finished capitalgoods (unfinished
goods are not part of theproductive stocks).The models used in this work
rely on an intertemporal laborsupply function and are drivenbasically by
real shocks that affecttechnology and the productivityof the representative
worker52
52The real shocks have permanent(autocorrelated) and transitory
components; the former alsocontribute to the cumulativemovements or
"momentum" in employment and output.The 1980 paper by Kydlandand Prescott
includes random shocks tonominal wages as well, but thesemonetary distur-
bances are secondary.The 1982 model containsreal shocks only.-60-
Investmentrealizations are a distributed—lag functionof investment
plans.But the series of new capitalappropriations and contracts and orders
for plant and equipment thatproxy for investment plans are also serially
correlated like the expenditures that followthem, only less so (see,e.g.,
Zarnowitz, op. cit.).Hence they lack the random-shockproperty which the
equilibriumtheorists look for in "an essentialpropagator of business cycle
fluctuations" (Taylor in Fischer,ed., 1980, p.192).Nevertheless they are
an important link in the cyclicalprocess.The lag of investment expenditures
behind investment decisions isan essential element in several otherwisequite
different theories of businesscycles (Mitchell, 1913; Kalecki, 1935;Hicks,
1950).
Inventory investment providesstill another potential channel for
persistence effects in equilibriummodels.In Blinder and Fischer (1981),an
unanticipated rise in money and pricesleads firms to sell out of inventories
at the same time as they increaseoutput.In subsequent periods, production
is gradually raised to restockthe depleted inventories.More specifically,
inventory investment dependspositively on the excess of thedesired stock of
inventories over the available stock(N-Nt)and inversely on the price—
surprise term -p1) The aggregate supply function has vary
positively with Qandthe same price surprise (as inLucas, 1972, 1973) but
now also with(N-Nt)
.Thedesired inventoryNwill stimulate
activity, but a rise inNtrelative toNwill discourage it.Even with
Na constant, this model can account forsome serial correlation of
output.With interest-sensitiveNt
,largerfluctuations would result since
even fully anticipated changes inmoney wouldhave some real effects (Blinder
and Fischer, 1981, sec. 5).—61—
This approach draws on someold ideas about theaggregate sales-inventorY—
income nexus in businesscycles (see section 111-5above)afld combines them with
elements of the newequilibrium models for arather uneasy match.It needs to
be recalled, too,that the role of inventoryadjustments is large duringmild
recessions and slowdowns such asprevailed in the post-WorldWar II period but
otherwise supporting ratherthan central (cf.Blinder and Holtz-Eakin,198k).
Summing up, thecost-motivated adjustments lags,durability and long
gestation periods of capitalgoods, and desiredinventory effects haveall been
long recognized asimportant in studies ofbusiness cycles.These elements,
however, do not exactlymesh with the basic coreof the equilibriummodel.The
random monetary shocks andprice surprises havereduced and lessintelligible
parts to play, while thereal factors in the"propagation" processes move tothe
center of the stage.These extensions, indeed,"may undermine thequantitative
role of underlyingintertemporal substitutionmechanism as the basis for
fluctuations in output andemployment" (Barro, 1981, p.I9).
5.Rationality, Knowledge, andUncertainty
To be "rational" in atechnical sense, expectationsmust be consistent with
the structure of the givenmodel. Unless they are onthe whole5elf_fulfilling,
the model of behaviorassumed to be ruled by themis vitiated.Given the
relevant information set, it maybe possible to solve aRE model for its
equilibrium path over all future.As new information becomesavailable, the
forecast-solution is updated.Used as a principle ofmodeling dynamic
stochastic equilibria, REgained wide popularity andproduced important new
insights.3
53meseinclude the criticism of someaspects of macroeconOmetricmodels,
the analysis of competitivemarkets with imperfectinformation, and work on
the consequences of endogenousexpectations for the effectivenessof economic
policies (see Lucas, 1976;Poole, 1976).These matters lieoutside the scope
of this paper.Assessments of the RE modelsabound (Shiller, 1978;Kantor,
1979; S. Fischer, ed.,1980; McCalluifl et al.,1980).For surveys of the
literature and references, seeBegg, 1982; Sheffrin,1983; and Frydman and
Phelps, eds., 1983.-62-
However, even in relatively simple linearmodels, the computational
problems posed by this radically logicalapproach are often formidable.Using
RE as a model of actual behavior cannotmean imputing to economic agents
generally the ability to solve such problems.Rather it is the markets that
are supposed to work as if they somehow approximatedthis capacity.This
could be interpreted along the lines of whatmay be called a weak version of
the REH:market incentives and penalties favor thedominance of optimal or
cost-efficient predictions..Firms and individuals whose forecastsare
consistently poor will not be able to surviveeconomically.The anticipations
of those who do survive will tend tocome true.This implies that predic—
tively valuable information,on which such anticipations are based, isscarce
so that collecting it is a profitable activity (Grossmanand Stiglitz, 1980).
Such propositions, when applied towell-functioning individual markets,
seem simply good, standard economics.In the aggregate, they need not imply
more than a long-run tendency toward equilibrium,promoted by learning from
experience but inhibited by limitedopportunities for controlled experi-
ments.Thus no firm link is established betweenthe type of model and the
expectational hypothesis used.In particular, RE models have beenbuilt
without the property of continuousmarket clearing.In principle, various
types of disequilibria could beexpected by people and modeled with theaid of
RE methodology; or, if expectationa].confusions prevail, no unique solutions
should be found.
The REH of the macroeconomic literaturein the 1970s, however, isa
strong version which adds to thereasonable premise of rationaluse of costly
information another assumption, namelythat the available data and models
provide sufficient knowledge about thefuture so that the prevailing expecta-
tions are free of any systematicerrors and consistent with continuous—63—
aggregateequilibriUfli.Economic behavior is guided bysubjective probabil-
ities which on the average agreewith the true frequencies ofthe events in
question.lJnlike in Knight (1921) andKeynes (1936) there is nouncertainty
as to what theseobjective probabilitiesare.Sk
Now there seem to be no good apriori reasons why this shouldgenerally
be so; indeed, thebelief that it is not accountsfor most of the objections
to the REH.It is evident that there is noagreement on what is the
"objective" probability distributionof future outcomes for the economyat any
time, since different theoriesand models coexist.Another reason why
forecasts differ across people,firms, etc., is that informationand skills to
use it are not evenlydistributed.
Attempts to form rationalpredictions of any macro-variablethat depends
on anticipatoryactions of many or all agentsin the economy involve
adjustments through a learning processin which not only theindividual
forecaster's own beliefs but also thoseof others are continuallyevaluated.
Each agent, then, tries topredict the average forecast, orwhat others are
likely to predict that averagewill be, and so on.This is the difficult
"infinite regress" problem well knownfrom the "beauty contest"example of
Keynes (1936, p. 156).Although increasingly andingeniously attacked, this
problem is still far from beingfully tractable or understood.However, an
important result that is stronglysuggested by this work is that aunique,
stable RE equilibrium, path alongwhich prices continually clearall markets,
entails the collective consistencyof individual plans.But individual
rationality (the cornerstone of modernmicroeconomic analysis) does not
Indeed, Lucas, 1977, p.15, argues that "In casesof uncertainty,
economic reasoning will be of novalue."For the REH to apply, business
cycles must represent "repeatedinstances of essentiallysimilar events. .."necessarily imply such a consistency.55
In a stochastically stationary environment that has persisted longenough
to be familiar, agents are assumed to have learned all theycan about the
probability distributions they face.6In the economy as it is, however,
change is to a large extent unanticipated and learning isperpetual.In
models with learning and disparate expectations,convergence to the RE equili-
brium requires that agents know no less than the lawsgoverning the change in
the key parameters of the economy and the effects ofexogenous shocks.
Learning itself can act as a cyclical propagator mechanismby inducing serial
and cross correlations in forecasts (Townsend, 1978, 1983aand b).
The strong assumptions of prior knowledge,are implausible but there
seems to be no alternative to them that would be satisfactory from the RE
point of view.57Some simple but flexible rules of adaptive expectations (AE)
may be consistent with optimal learning (Taylor, 1975; B. Friedman, 1979)and
some models with a common simple rule converge to an equilibrium solution(for
an example, see Bray, 1983).But the collective adherence to a rule which, if
individually followed, would yield biased forecastsis in conflict with the
idea of the optimizing representative agent ina decentralized market economy.
It is important to distinguish between the critique ofthe RE and the
critique of the particular market-clearing models withRE (see, e.g.,
Fair,1978).Many critics agree that the pre-.RE treatments ofexpectations are
555ee severalessays and the introductory chapter by the editors in
Frydman and Phelps, eds., 1983.
56Most ofthe early basic RE models, constructedon this premise, simply.
contain no learning processes.
.57Withoutsome such assumptions, convergence may not occur even in
single—market contexts (Cyert and DeGroot, 197U; B. Friedman,1979; DeCanio,
1979).—65-
generallyarbitrary and, at least inprinciple, inferior (Tobin1980, pp. 28—
29;Meltzer, 1982, p. 3).Furtheradvances in the intenselyused and studied
RE methodology are to beexpected (as argued, a.o.,in Lucas and Sargent,
1978; Lucas, 1981; S. Grossman,1981).Still, the claim to generalvalidity
of the strong form of theREH as applied tomarket-clearing macromodels is now
rejected by a wide range ofeconomists (Arrow, 1978; Tobin,1980, 1981;
Laidler, 1981, pp. 11—15;Friedman, 1982, p. 630).
In the present context,the critical questions concernthe stationarity
and predictability of the processesobserved during business cycles.Their
recurrent and sequential natureis indeed wellestablished,bUt so is their
lack of periodicity and the.large inter-cycle differencesin durations and
amplitudes (see part II above).The separability of businesscycles from the
long trends an by no meansbe taken for granted.These are arguments against
the applicability of the REmethods.In a nonstationary worldwith a mixture
of random and seriallycorrelated disturbances,uncertainty in the sense of
Knight and Keynes is pervasive, evenunder the (empiricallydubious) premises
of no structural change andstable policy regimes.
The monetarist models withAE may be interpreted tocontain uncer—
tainty.8Meltzer (1982) distinguishesbetween uncertainty, which is
associated with variations innonstatioflary means resultingfrom "permanent"
changes in levels or growthrates, and risk, which isassociated with trans-
itory, random deviationsaround stable trends.He argues that the currentRE
models err in ignoringuncertainty which is essential to anexplanation of the
persistence of cyclicalcontractions.Models of business cyclesshould allow
8See Friedman, 1972, pp. 923-924, on uncertainty;also Muth, 1960;
Frenkel, 1975; Mussa, 1975; Brunner,Cukierman, and Meltzer,1980; and Friedman,
1982, pp 415 and 14147,onthe rationality andempirical usefulness of AE.—66—
permanentchanges to occur but not to be identified immediately.Stochastic
shocks, whether monetary or real, have permanent andtransitory components
which cannot be reliably separated (new informationreduces but does not
eliminate the confusion).The rational response to the shocks is adaptive,
taking the form of gradual adjustments of beliefsabout the permanent values
of the endogenous variables.59
What is the evidence of how people actually formtheir expectations?
Recent work using survey data has been preoccupiedwith tests for the
rationality of inflation forecasts.Typically, actual values are regressedon
predicted values, and the forecasts fail the testswhen (1) the sample
intercept and slope estimates are significantlydifferent from zero and one,
respectively, and/or (2) the residualerrors are significantly autocor—
related.Data from the semiannual surveys of economicforecasters conducted
since 19J47 by Joseph A. Livingston,a syndicated financial columnist, reject
the REH according to most of these and relatedtests (Pesando, 1975; Carlson,
1977; Wachtel, 1977; Moore, 1977b; Pearce,1979; Gramlich, 1983; more favorable
results are reported by Mullineaux, 1978).Tests of individual forecasts
confirm those of the group average forecasts,and the results from the
quarterly NBER—ASA economic outlooksurveys are consistent with those obtained
60 for the Livingston surveys (Figlewskiand Wachtel, 1981; Zarnowitz, 1983)
59Note that thisis a general approach, compatible with Keynesian,mone-
tarist, and other theories.It is used in the 1980 model of Brunneret al.,
in which monetary shocks affect only theprice level and the rate of interest,
while unemployment is caused byerrors due to the inability of workers to
distinguish between permanent and transitoryreal productivity shocks.This
model is subject to all doubts concerningthe hypotheses of complete neutral-
ity of money and intertemporal substitutionin labor supply.
60Therelevant literature on the properties ofexpectationa]. data is very
voluminous and can be only briefly summarizedhere.For a more comprehensive
review of the evidence, see Zarnowitz,198)4.-67-
Studiesof consumer survey data from the SurveyResearch Center of the
University of Michigan show mixed butin large measure negative results
(Juster, 1979; Huizinga, 1980; Curtin,1982; Grarnlich, 1983).The same
applies to the surveys of businessexecutives (deLeeuw and McKelvey,1981) and
European and Japanese surveys(Aiginger, 1981; Papadia, 1982; Visco,198)4).61
Few authors have tested data onanticipations for variables other than
inflation.U.S. manufacturers' sales expectationshave been on the whole
negatively assessed in a comprehensivestudy by Hirsch and Lovell (1969), more
positively by Pashigian (1964) and Irvine(1981).For professional economic
forecasters, including econometric service bureaus,there is strong evidence
that predictions of inflation in the1970s have been generally biased, while
those of other important aggregates(growth in nominal and real GNP, the
unemployment rate) pass the rationality testsmuch more frequently and better
(MeNees, 1978; Zarnowitz,1983).62
The REH finds the strongest support in the"efficient markets" literature
(Fama, 1970; Poole, 1976).This is readily understandable sincefinancial
assets and commodities are traded in wellorganized and informed competitive
auction markets.However, some tests of forecasts by activeparticipants in
these markets reject the REH, as shown inthe survey of Wall Street predic-
tions of interest rates by B. Friedman(1980).This could merely mean that
this survey was not adequately representativeof the most successful traders
61A11 these surveys collect largely qualitative responses (on the
direction and in some cases range rather thanthe precise size of the expected
price movements).The conversion of these data to thequantitative form
required for the tests presents some difficultproblems.
62Formany early forecasts of U.S.aggregate series, there is evidence of
significant bias (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969).The most common pattern is
underestimation of growth, and, less frequently,of cyclical changes (Theil,
1958; Zarnowitz, 1967).There are indications of adaptive learningbehavior
(Mincer, 1969).-68-
andhence of the market.6
Expectations which fail the rationality criteria in ex post tests may
well prove entirely consistent with optimizing ex ante behavior once the
consequences of uncertainty, unique events, defective models, and fragmentary
or costly information are taken into account (Zarnowitz, 1982).Also, they
need not be adaptive or otherwise backward-looking only.In fact, it appears
that time—series models rarely explain statistically much more than half of
the variance of expectational data (see several papers in Mincer, ed., 1969;
Aiginger, 1979).The evidence suggests that economic expectations are neither
mere projections of the past nor flashes of intuition about the future but
combinations of both extrapolative and autonomous components.Predictions of
real growth and inflation are usually diversified and uncertain, seldom
demonstrably self-fulfilling.Anticipatory action is often inhibited by prior
commitments incurred in part to reduce uncertainty.Thus not all past is
bygones and expectations are not all-important.Yet they matter a great deal
and are a proper subject for empirical as well as theoretical studies,6
6.Modelsof Financial Instability
Speculative excesses or "manias" have attracted the attention of contem-
poraries and economic historians since at least the Dutch Tulip Bubble of
6Indeed,Mishkin (1981a) constructs forecasts from the bond market data
which fail to reject the rationality tests for interest-rate expectations.
But the concurrent bond-market predictions of inflation fail the tests.The
argument that this reflects the unusual character of the 1960s,a period of
rising inflation, is not really persuasive.The inflation forecasts in the
perhaps even more "unusual" 1970s seem generally worse yet.Long periods of
tranquility are hard to find.
61The evidencefrom surveys has certain important limitations and must be
assessed with caution, but the consensus of careful independent tests basedon
such data should be taken seriously; indeed, the materialsnow available are
rich and in need of much further exploration (cf. Tobln, 1980,p. 29).
Lessons from such work can usefully counter and correct the freely speculative
analysis that treats expectations as being inevitably "unobservable."—69-
1625—37.Financed by credit expansion and characterized by "overtrading" in
real or financial assets,e.g., gold, land, or securities, they have been
associated with more than two dozen major booms in business activity, often
involving many countries (Kindleberger, 1978).Historically, they tended to
be followed by "panics," that is, distress selling of the same assets to
reacquire money and repay debt, and crashes in the prices of the now illiquid
objects of the speculation.The resulting financial crises accompanied or
aggravated the downturns in the business cycle.
'In asset markets, the current price depends as a rule positively on its
own expected rate of change.Expectations are influenced by outside events as
well as the "market fundamentals"--economic determinants of the rates of
return.The markets may react to the events by adopting such price antici-
pations as would drive the actual prices away from the path consistent with
the fundamentals.In this view, accepted much more readily by practitioners
than theorists, anticipations of a strong market trend are occasionally
capable of causing speculative "bubbles"--cuznulative, even explosive,
fluctuations in prices of selected assets.
Very recently, these ideas, long mistrusted by most contemporary
economists, began to receive support from writers using rigorous techniques of
equilibrium analysis.Shiller (1981a and b) concludes that stock price
movements are too large to be explained by an efficient-markets model which
incorporates future dividends, capital gains and inflation.Blanchard and
Watson (1982) argue that bubbles can occur in efficient markets with new entry
and no unexploited arbitrage opportunities; also, that they have potentially-70-
strong real effects, on relative asset prices, wealth, and aggregatedemand.6
Much of the recent work in this area uses the overlapping-generations
approach due to Samuelson (1958) (see Kareken and Wallace, eds., 1980).
Models of this type, with markets continously cleared by price movements,
typically have a multiplicity of RE solutions, a large proportion of which may
involve fluctuations prompted by arbitrary but self-fulfilling shifts in
anticipations (Azariadis, 1981).Thus, if the belief that sunspots predict
future prices were widely held, many individuals would act on it so as to bear
out their expectations.Cass and Shell (1983) argue that RE equilibria
generally can be influenced by extrinsic uncertainty, i.e., random phenomena
such as "animal spirits" or "market psychology," which do not affect the basic
parameters of the economy (endowments, preferences, technologies).The
conditions under which this would not be the case are so unrealistic as to be
devoid of any empiricalinterest.66
These abstract treatments rationalize the role in financial crises of
"sunspots," but they do not tell us how much these interacting and self-
fulfilling expectations matter.The crises are seldom isolated phenomena;
rather they form a part of some business cycles and are thus related to the
6The problems of indeterminacy and instability of RE equilibria are now
well recognized and much studied.Conditions under which bubbles may be
excluded from the RE paths of the price level have been specified for some
monetary models (see, e.g., Brock, 1975).Tests for the German hyperinflation
of the early 1920s reported by Flood and Garber (1980) give no support to the
hypothesis that a price-level bubble occurred in that extreme episode.But it
is easy to see that expectations alone cannot account for a long or rapid
inflation in the absence of persistent or very high rates of money creation.
Clearly, bubbles are much more likely in speculative markets for financial
assets.
66They include (1) strong RE-—unanimityof beliefs; (2) complete
markets --thereare markets for all types of contingent claims; and (3)
unrestrictedaccess to these markets for all agents at all times --acrossthe
"generations."(1) and (2) are merely improbable; (3)isaltogether
impossible.-71—
monetary, institutional, and real factors involved in these cycles.Market
psychology plays a large role insome crises, mainly the major ones.
Mild financial crises of recent U.S. history, called "credit crunches",
are associated by some observers primarily with reduced availability of
credit, not high interest rates (Wojnilower, 1980).Credit rationing by banks
is linked to imperfect information about the borrowers' default risk (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981; Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983).When banks refuse to renew
their loans, the high-risk borrowers and many small firms will be unable to
secure credit elsewhere and forced to curtail investment and perhaps current
operations.The retrenchment may or may not be caused by restrictive open-
market policies of the central bank.Under fractional banking, loans and
deposits are highly collinear, so it is difficult to use the data to distin-
guish between this "Oredit" hypothesis and a "money supply" hypothesis of a
downturn.Since the early 1950s, broad credit aggregates such as the total
debt of U.S. nonfinancial sectors have been closely and stably related to
GNP -betteror not worse than the money stock and monetary base series (B.
Friedman, 1983).
In several collected papers, Minsky (1982) argues that long periods of
prosperity interrupted only by mild recessions or slowdowns breed overcon-
fidence, excessive short-term financing by banks of long-term business
projects, investment booms interacting with stodk market booms, growing
indebtedness and illiquidity.Innovative practices and new instruments are
used to increase the availability of'investmentfinance:money should be
broadly defined and is endogenously determined.Its supply, however, becomes
at some point inelastic as uncertainty grows and banks increasingly deem it
prudent to retrench (or monetary authorities act to constrain inflation).The
demand for credit to finance planned and progressing investment projects-72-
nevertheless continues to rise.It takes sharp increases in interest rates
and declines in the present value of expected net returns on capital assets to
check and reverse the expansion in new investment.Business cash flows and
profits decline and eventually so do total sales, output, and employment.The
resulting losses force many industrial concerns and financial intermediaries
into refinancing of debt and liquidation of assets to raise cash; many
retrench, some fail. When a sufficiently large number of these units exper-
ience inadequate cash flows from current operations and declining ability to
sustain debt, a financial crisis must occur, unless the central bank inter-
venes, injecting sufficient money into the system and preventing large bank
defaults and business failures,If a crisis is averted and stimulative
monetary and fiscal policies continue, a mild recession may ensue but another
inflationary and eventually destabilizing investment boom will soon follow.
This is a disequilibrium theory with strong endogenous elements.The
originating factors are real, but monetary and credit changes have much to do
with the propagation of the cycle and are primarily responsible for its worst
manifestations (see also the summary in Table 5).This is the opposite of
some recent theories (such as that of Lucas) which have monetary shocks and real
propagation mechanisms.Minsky's hypothesis predicts the recurrence of'
financialcrises and business depressions, which invites controversy.It
deserves to be carefully evaluated, but it is difficult to test (in part
inevitably so since financial crises and depressions are rare and complex
events).In general terms, however, the account provided by Minsky tends to be
consistent with the history of speculative investment booms, financial crises,
and deep depressions in the United States (see Burns and Mitchell, 1946, ch.11,
sec. VI; Kindleberger, 1978; Hoyt, 1933).It also has interesting connections-73—
with several diverse business cycle theories.6
7.Demand and Supply Shocks and Responses:A Search for New Concepts
Dissatisfaction with the results obtained by using random money supply
shocks and price misperceptions prompted some economists to experiment with
different models (while retaining in most cases the basic RE methodology).
Abstracting from numerous detail, one can distinguish the following approaches.
(1) Focus on interest rates and related factors.These received much
attention in the literature from Wicksell and the Austrians to Keynes.
Monetary intervention or excesses of credit creation were seen as causing
interest rates to deviate from their equilibrium levels so that they fail to
coordinate saving and investment decisions.Inconsistencies arise in the
aggregate between the expectations of those who make these decisions and the
expectations of the financial intermediaries.Monetarists opposed these ideas
on the ground that investment and savings depend on the real interest rates
which cannot be affected by the banking system, except very transitorily. In
the early RE models, too, interest rates had no important roles to play.
However, fluctuations in credit and interest, which have been so pronounced in
recent years, are receiving renewed attention in the literature since the late
1970s (Leijonhufvud, 1981, ch. 7, and in Frydman and Phelps, eds,, 1983, ch.
10).
This includes some new departure along the incomplete-information line of
approach.McCulloch (1977, 1981) argues that business fluctuations are asso-
ciated with unanticipated changes in interest rates that misdirect real in-
vestment decisions toward awrongmix of capital goods and so distort the in—
credits primarily Keynes, whom he interprets as having a dynamic
analysis that does not rely on price rigidities; but his emphasis on the
instability of credit flows and business debt relative to income recalls the
Austrians and draws on Fisher.- 7L -
tertemporalproduction process (as in the real part of the theories of Hayek
and Mises).68In an equilibrium model by Grossman and Weiss (1982), random
real shocks affect productivity and the real interest rate, causing investment
and output to fluctuate.Random monetary shocks affect inflation and the nom-
inal interest rate, with the effect of amplifying the cycle.Agents make er-
rors in trying to infer the ex ante values of the real rate and inflation from
the nominal rate (which includes the two) because the latter's movements con-
tain much random noise.The critical gap in information concerns the relative
rates of real return (on own compared with other investments).The model in-
volves only supply decisions, with the role of demand being purely passive.6
Recent empirical work suggests that output (real GNP or industrial
production) interacts with price—level indexes, comprehensive credit
aggregates, interest rates, and narrow money aggregates.None of these
variables is definitely exogenous relative to all the others; in particular,
money adds to the incremental prediction of the real variables along with
credit and interest rates, but it is not predetermined or predominant (Sims,
68The novel elementis the stress on "misintermediation" rather than on
the money-creating function of the banks (the two are closely connected).
Banks and other intermediaries, by borrowing short and lending long, are said
to mismatch asset and liability maturities and to add to the uncertainty about
interest rates by creating imbalances in their term structure.This
hypothesis and the related estimates deal only with nominal, not with real
rates, besides posing other problems that cannot be discussed in the available
space; but it does address an important and -long recognized institutional
aspect of financial instability (to which the previous section also briefly
referred).
6investment hereis equated to the process of transforming labor input
into next period's output.No durable goods are produced.The nominal shocks
take the form of disturbances to money demand.These simplifications are made
to allow some difficult problems in the dynamic equilibrium theory to be rig-
orously analyzed, but they also deprive the model of some highly relevant
characteristics of the modern capitalist economies which experience business
cycles.This is, to be sure, not uncommon in the recent theoretical
literature.-75—
1980b; B. Friedman,1983).70
These results are interesting and may prove robust, but they should be
interpreted with much caution.Nominal interest rates may matter because
their changes are read as signals of changes in the stock of money and
inflation.But they may also be important in their own right as the major
part of the true costs of credit.Historically, their adjustments to
inflation, (and deflation) were sufficiently sluggish and incomplete to suggest
that people treated the nominal rates as if they were adequate proxies for the
real ones.Evidence going back to the 1860s shows that this. condition
continued to prevail at least well into the 1950s; only thereafter did the
relationship between interest and inflation strengthen to become rather close
in the 1960s and 1970s.More recently, it weakened again considerably.71
The ex post real interest rates, pre and post-tax, have small cyclical
variations, which makes it difficult to detect how they are correlated with
movements in real variables, but this is rightly seen as a problem in
measurement rather than evidence of no significant relationships (Mishkin,
1981b).Real rates rose sharply to unusually high levels in the early years
of the Great Depression and again in 1980-82, a period of severe recession and
70mese exogeneity tests ask whether, say, the lagged values of money
help explain or predict output in a regression equation containing the lagged
values of output itself and of the other variables.This question is answered
for each variable in the system in terms of all variables included.This
method of variance decomposition or accounting for the interactions among the
"innovations" (serially uncorrelated residuals) of the series in question
avoids some major shortcomings of simple distributed-lag regressions but
encounters some difficult problems of its own (see the references in text
above).
71These findings refer to the United States; for •the United Kingdom the
corresponding relation was much weaker throughout.See Friedman and Schwartz,
1982, ch.10.According to Summers, 1983, the impact of inflation on interest
rates has been much smaller throughout the post-World War II period than a
general equilibrium model would predict on classical assumptions, particularly
when properly allowing for the effective tax rates (see also Feldstein, 1976).-76—
strongdisinflation.It is only reasonable to view these changes as mainly
unanticipated and their probable net effects as seriouslyadverse.72The
measured real rates are inversely correlated with lagged inflation.Increased
money growth, then, by raising inflation, lowers the real rate; but the
evidence for a short—term effect of monetary policy, independent of inflation,
is mixed and weak (Shiller, 1980; Mishkin, 1981b).
(2) Focus on real factors.Consider two polar models:(A) Exogenous
fluctuations in real investment cause the business cycle.Banks meet the
borrowers' demand for money and the depositors' demand for money as the monetary
authority provides them with the necessary reserves at any given level of
interest rates.(B) Exogenous fluctuations in money supply cause the business
cycle.The demand for money continuously adjusts to the supply through
changes in permanent income associated with much larger changes in measured
real income or output.
Tobin (1970) sets the two models up so that (A) implies a consistent
pattern of early cyclical timing for monetary growth rates or deviations from
trend, while (B) does not.Friedman denies that these examples cast doubt on
his views.The two debaters agree that the evidence on leads and lags alone
cannot prove any hypothesis about causation (though it can disaprove some);
also, that both of the above models are far from adequate.Indeed, (A) is an
oversimplification and partial distortion of Keynes, (B) of Friedman.The
widely used general IS/LM-AD/AS framework can accomodate some of the ideas of
some of the Keynesians and monetarists with respect to the effects and
interactions of both autonomous expenditure and monetarychanges.73But this
T2But note that the real rates stayed relatively high in 1983_8L without
visibly obstructing a vigorous recovery.Presumably, once the economy
adjusted to the large changes, the smaller ones have but weak effects.-77-
long—ruling paradigm was designed for comparative statics ofexogenous
interventions with a stationary environment; its adaptation to dynamic and
expectatiorial processes confronts a host of difficult and unresolved problems.
Earlier sections contain several diverse illustrations of recent work
oriented toward nonmonetary (real, psychological, institutional) explanations
of macroeconomic instability.Other such efforts relate to the old idea
(preceding Keynes, though often associated with him) that bothmoney and real
activity respond to the common factor of fluctuations in aggregatedemand and
the corresponding changes in interest rates and the value of existing
assets.Sims (1980b), referring to Tobiri (1970), urges the development ofa
stochastic version of this theory.Some new historical studies also emphasize
the importance of factors other than the independent influenceon business
conditions of changes in the stock of money.
It remains to take note of the most radical reactions againstmonetarist
and monetary-shock theories by some strong believers in general-equilibrium
73isandLM relate output and interest rates, AD and AS(aggregate
demand and supply functions) relate output and the price level.it is assumed
that the IS and AD curves slope downward, the LM and AScurves upward.The
Keynesian view is often associated with relatively steep IS and flatLM, the
monetarist view with relatively flat IS and steep LMcurves.But this
interpretation is by no means universally acceptable;even if accepted, it
leaves open other important. issues inthe controversy.The IS/LM-AD/AS mmodel
evolved from Hicks, 1935, 1937, through a long series of writingsincluding
notably Patinkin, 1956.
74mus Temin, 1976,attributes the 1929 downturn to a decline in
"autonomous" spending (interestingly, mainly in consumption andexports rather
than investment).For monetarist counterarguinents, see the essays by Schwartz
and Brunner in Brunner, ed., 1981; for a view that bothmoney and investment
(and other spending) mattered, see Gordon and Wilcox in thesame volume.
King and Plosser, 1982, examine the possibility that the positive
correlation between the rates of'growthin output and monetary aggregates
reflects in large part the causal chain running from businessactivity to
"inside money", i.e., bank deposits.
Bernanke, 1983, produces evidence linking the sharp drop in output during
the early 1930s to the reduced quality and higher real costs ofcredit
intermediation services, a result of the institutional weakness andcrises of
banking.-78-
modeling and the neutrality of money.Here the main idea is that unantici-
pated changes in tastes and tethnology cause intersectoral shifts of human and
physical capital associated with much friction and temporary idleness.Unem-
ployment generated by alargenumber of partly independent shocks to different
sectors will persist for considerable time because rapid transfers of
resources are costly, the more so the greater the specialization of the
production factors (Black, 1982).But changes in tastes and technology will
tend to penalize some sectors and benefit others, causing numerous shifts in
relative prices and outputs; they may occasionally have significant net
favorable or adverse effects on growth but can hardly be responsible for
recurrent sequences of expansions and contractions in aggregate economic
activity.
The most restrictive formal model of purely real "business cycles" (Long
and Plosser, 1983) abstracts not only from money and government but also from
technological change, durable goods, and adjustment costs; it assumes RE,
complete information, and stable preferences.There are random shocks to
outputs of the many commodities, each of which can be either consumed or used
as input in the production of any other commodity during each unit period.
The optimal allocation rule is such that when the i-th output is unexpectedly
high (low), the simultaneous inputs of iin all its productive uses are
increased (reduced).It is shown that this works to propagate the effects of
the output shocks both forward in time and across the sectors of the
economy.The model is intended to serve as a benchmark for evaluating the
importance in actual business cycles of the many factors it omits, but it
75mis recalls the "horizontal maladjustments,"which were treated as a
potentially important aggravating factor, but not a prime cause, in classical
writings.See p.18 above.-79-
admittedly presents serious problems and the approach itself is
questionable.76
(3)Focuson the causes and effects of contractual wage and price
setting.Recent literature is much concerned with the specification of
economic reasons for the existence of explicit or implicit multiperiod
contracts that limit the flexibility of wages and prices in response to
unanticipated shifts in demand and supply.77The "contract—theoretic" models
based on this work drop the assumption of market clearing and the reliance on
price errors and intertemporal substitution effects.They restore the changes
in aggregate demand to their old role as a direct determinant of fluctuations
in the real aggregates by delaying the adjustments in the contractually
predetermined wages and the wage-related prices.-
The main models of this type are monetarist in the original sense of
relating short-run fluctuations in output to monetary policy operating via
changes in demand.This is so even where the policy is based on a fixed
feedback rule known to the public, because the money stock can be changed more
frequently than the wage is renegotiated (Phelps and Taylor, 1977; Fischer,
76particular,the model has constant employment of labor while the
commodity outputs fluctuate.Simulations based on a 1967 input-output table
for six major industry divisions result in output series that show consider-
able comovements and two complete quasi-cycles in runs of 100 unit periods of
undefined length.It is not clear whether the fluctuations due to the output
shocks are separable from those due to other factors.
770ne hypothesis is that fixed-wage, variable employment contracts sell
risk-averse workers partial insurance against the variability of their incomes
(Baily, 1974; D.F. Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 1975).Another is that labor
contracts or understandings treat incomes as normal returns on the loyalty and
efficiency of long—term employees and protect large investments in firm-
specific human capital (Hall, 1980b; Okun, 1981, chs. 2 and 3).Steady
pricing policies are used to reduce the costs of shopping and attract steady
customers (Okun, op. cit., ch. U).In sum, contracts are attempts to deal
economically with a variety of "transaction" (information, negotiation,
adjustment) costs in the face of price instability and general uncertainty.
For surveys, see. R.J. Gordon, 1976; Barro, 1981.-80-
1977a; Taylor, 1980a).The authors work with staggered contracts in which
wages are linked to expectations that areweakly "rational" (i.e., model-
consistent).Fischer relates wages to price level forecasts; his contracts
are (frustrated) attempts to keep real wagesfrom falling in the face of
inflationary policy.Taylor relates wages to other past and anticipated wage
settlements; the degree of inertia in these interrelationshelps explain the
persistence of unemployment.These models have attracted much attention and
criticism.78
According to the "credibility" hypothesis (Feilner, 1976,1980), a
consistent policy of adhering to preannounced moderate moneygrowth targets
can deter inflationary wage and price settingand reduce instability in the
long run.A correlate is that unions will push for higher wages in labor
contract negotiations and business will respond by raising pricesif both
parties expect the monetary authorities to "ratify" their decisionsthrough
accommodative policies.This view differs in some important respects from
monetarism and the newer RE and contract theories, but it also incorporates
some of their elements.It recognizes that, in practice, systematic policy
components are often weak and only belatedly detectable (see also Sims,
1982).It is related to the idea of "coordination failures" (Leijonhufvud,
1981) in a game-theoretic form:it is possible for expectational impasses to
develop, e.g., a recession-cum—inflation may continue while the central bank
waits for wage demands to moderate and business and labor wait for a resurnp-
tion of monetary expansion (Phelps, 1981).All this certainly raises issues
8The issues include the consistency of the assumed contract features
with rational behavior (Barro, 1977b; Fischer, 1977b) and the reasons why
wages are not fully indexed under anticipated inflation(Brunner and Meltzer,
eds., 1977).For a detailed critique of Fischer and Taylor, and a proposed
improved model, see McCallum, 1982.For some evidence and further discussion,
see Taylor, 1980b and 1983.-81-
that are very important in dealing with inflation; how much bearing it has
here depends on how strongly policy-induced changes in monetary growth and
inflation influence business cycles.The notion that such changes are the
principal cause of the cycles (which many now accept as if it were self-
evident) is not supported by the long record of cyclical instabilityco-
existing with alternating extended periods of inflations and deflations.It
is also countered by the argument that business contractions, whatever their
causes, have deflationary or disinflationary effects.79
Most recent RE models, including those of' the contract-theoretic type,
consider only one determinant of aggregate demand, the real money balances,
and concentrate on the effects of monetary policy.But shifts in aggregate
demand may be due to real and expectational as well as monetary factors.They
may reflect the instability of any of the major expenditure components of'real
GNP.Neither theory nor evidence support the. focus on nominal demand shocks
and real supply shocks alone.In recent times, at least, consumer capital
outlays have been no less cyclical than business investment (of. Gordon and
Veitch, 198L).Indeed, new models of consumption which embrace RE have
consumers respond promptly and strongly to any new information that revises
their forecasts of future income.This in itself would tend to increase the
sensitivity of consumption, and hence of income, to unanticipated changes in
aggregate demand or "autonomous expenditures" (compared with the earlier
models which used adaptive rather than rational expectations in the
calculation of permanent income).The increased instability on the demand
side is offset only when the REH is combined with speedy clearing of'the
79None of this, ofcourse, is to deny that the inflationary bias of
government actions and the reactions to it have economic consequences of great
importance; what is questioned is the view (going far beyond the credibility
hypothesis) that these consequences include the business cycle.-82-
markets and a highly stable and inelastic aggregate supply curve, i.e., in the
new "classical" equilibrium models (Bilson, 1980, pp. 279—283, and comment by
Hall, ibid., p.301).80
V.Conclusion:The Needed Synthesis
Business cycles belong to the history of modern economies with inter-
dependent markets, free enterprise, and private ownership of financial assets
and capital goods.They developed in the era of great growth of industry,
banking and credit.They are varied and changing, even while retaining their
general characteristics of perstistence and pervasiveness as well as specific
regularities of amplitude and timing.All this was long recognized by serious
scholars and careful observers with abiding interest in the subject.
For a long time, too, there was a substantial consensus among these
economists that business cycles have mainly endogenous explanations involving
recurrent fluctuations in interrelated monetary and real variables, prices and
quantities, expectations and realizations.The theories tended to agree on
the cast and setting, disagreeing principally on which factors should play
star and which supporting roles.Chance and outside disturbances were left
behind the stage, interfering with and modifying the action but not
determining its main course.The cycle had plural causes and effects; it
produced and resolved its own stresses and resources, nationally and
internationally.Few attributed it to any single factor or defect, and few
believed that it can be eliminated by any single, low-cost type of policy
intervention or institutional reform.
The 1930s convinced many that the economy is not merely cyclical but
80Many interestingtheoretical and empirical studies of the consumption
function appeared in recent years, but the implications of this work for
business cycles remain to be worked out.See Hall, 1978; Davidson and Hendry,
1981; Blanchard and Wyplosz, 1981; Flavin, 1981; and Bernanke, 1982.-83-
depression-prone.The instability of profits, investment, and credit (old
concerns) attracted renewed attention.In the 19140s and 1950s, however, there
was a rise of interest in the dynamics of multiplier-accelerator interaction
which yielded highly aggregative and purely endogenous models of potentially
unstable output fluctuations.The monetary, financial, and expectational
aspects of the cycle were largely neglected.Soon, strong reactions developed
against this one-sided conception.One took the form of stochastic, dynamic-
ally stable mathematical models.This greatly influenced macroeconometric
models which emphasized the destabilizing role of random shocks and exogenous
factors.
The other reaction against theories of endogenous instability was mone-
tarism.Its targets included not only the Keynesian models of aggregate
demand, with fluctuating but often weak investment and a major role for fiscal
policies to combat unemployment, but also the older models with unstable
credit-investment interactions.Fluctuations in monetary growth attributed to
erratic or misguided policies were made primarily responsible for disturbing
the basically stable private economy and creating "business cycles".The
real, financial, and expectational factors received little attention.
The natural-rate and rational-expectations hypothesis, plus the
discouraging record of the 1970s, led to new hopes for a program of study with
a grand design:to reconcile business cycles with the postulates of the com-
petitive general equilibrium theory in its modern dynamic form.The initial
approach relied upon random monetary shocks, price misperceptions, and inter—
temporal substitution of labor.However, critical analyses and tests soon
cast serious doubts on this construction and thereby on the underlying
premises, mainly that of flexible prices continuously clearing all markets.
No convincing remedy could be provided by adaptation of familiar elements of_814 -
older"disequilibrium" theories such as the accelerator arid lags due to costs
of adjustments in the stocks of'productionfactors.
Some equilibrium theorists questioned the importance of the disturbances
to money supply and tried to explain business cycles in real terms only.
Their RE models are more restrictive yet.They consist of supply reactions of
a "representative" producer-consumer to productivity or input-output shocks.
The environment is purely competitive or even of a Robinson Crusoe-type.
There is little or no evidence to support these models.
Contract theories, designed to explain why most wages and prices are
temporarily "sticky," formed the basis of very different models in which
aggregate demand fluctuations are restored to their usual prominence.Other
work, also using the currently favored RE methodology,, turned to factors with
a long history of service in business cycle models:uncertainty arid shifts in
"market psychology"; interest-rate misperceptions or maladjustments; long
investment gestation periods.
There is not much empirical validation that random shocks of all kinds
play as large a role in business cycle as has been attributed to them in
recent literature.The weight of exogenous policy factors, too, seems more
often than not overstated.The theoretical interest in self-sustaining
cycles, or elements thereof, declined in times when economic events and
thought favored a revival of the faith in the private sector's capacity for
stable growth.New work in this area, therefore, has been limited, but it
still produced some interesting and significant results.
The most disturbing aspect of what must be viewed as the new mainstream
literature (the RE models) is its increasing fragmentation in the face of
various theoretical problems and recalcitrant facts.The ruling research
strategy in these studies is to demonstrate for each particular model that one-85-
or more of the selected factors can contribute to fluctuations in total output
or employment, while recognizing that others can do so as well.The authors
are mainly concerned with theoretical possibilities rather than with explana-
tions of what actually happens.There is in general little regard for how the
pieces fit each other or the "real world."The variety of the iodels is only
loosely limited by the ingenuity of the theorists, but many of the offered
hypotheses are not tested and some are not testable.Small linear models are
favored because of their mathematical tractability in the equilibrium RE
framework, but this certainly does not mean that larger and/•or nonlinear
systems are somehow inferior.The criterion of conformity to stylized facts
would, in fact, suggest the. opposite.
As a matter of simple logic, if each of a number of models is indeed
valid, then it should inprinciple be possible to integrate them and improve
the theory.Of course, this is easier said than done, but when each model is
treated in isolation, there is little chance for the Job to be ever seriously
attacked.The conclusion reached here, then, is that a movement toward a
synthesis of the tested and nonfalsified hypotheses is urgently needed if real
progress is to be made in our understanding of business cycles.
In this view, research in this area will profit most from the confronta-
tion of testable hypotheses with a broad range of evidence on stylized facts
and from efforts to combine those hypotheses that survive the tests.This
assigns high priorities to the work on (1) the consolidation and updating of
findings from the historical and statistical business cycle studies, and (2)
using the results to eliminate those elements of the extant theories that are
definitely inconsistent with the evidence and to improve the modeling of the
other elements.This strategy could lead us away from the proliferation of
models which lopsidedly stress either the monetary or the real factors, either-86-
thesupply or the demand behavior, either random shocks or purely endogenous
movements; instead, we would be working toward a better comprehension of how
these forces interact.As was recognized early by the "classics," the sharp
dichotomies and monocausal theories tend to be invalidated by experience.
Also, the hypothesis that business cycles are all alike would itself be
tested in the course of this research.It is important to know not only what
the common core of the cyclical process has been for the U.S. economy in
recent times, but also how it may have changed historically and how it differs
from similar processes elsewhere.The knowledge is necessary for an assess-
ment of the temporal and spatial reference points of business cycle theory.
(For the most recent work on these problems, see R. J. Gordon, ed.,
forthcoming.)
We have witnessed a period of great intellectual ferment, activity, and
controversy in the theory of macroeconomic fluctuations and policies, but the
debate seems to be growing less heated lately and some signs ofa future
rapprochement can be discerned.The present may be a good time to ponder the
needed synthesis.Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
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